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Abstract
Undertaking a major clean energy transition in both developing countries and
developed countries is challenging. Well-designed policies weigh the cost and
benefit of every alternative. My dissertation considers different aspects of such
transitions in two very different contexts: a nationwide transition from kerosene
to cleaner burning propane in Indonesia, and a transition from a fossil fuel to
100 percent renewable electric system in Hawaii. As for the benefits of cleaner
energy, it helps us to understand to what extent a cleaner fuel transition could
improve people’s health and their well-being, and sheds light on some possible
channels through which better health arises. As for the cost of cleaner energy,
it also demonstrates how efficient variable pricing can lower the cost of clean
renewable energy. To assess how efficient pricing affects the cost of renewable
power, I introduce a new computational modeling tool that can simultaneously
consider key features of a real-time power system and a realistic characterization
of demand with potentially flexible end uses. The model is generalizable and can
be easily adapted to other settings.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of a household fuel conversion program on in-
fant mortality by examining a kerosene to liquid petroleum gas (LPG) conversion
program in Indonesia, one of the largest household energy transition projects ev-
er attempted in the developing world. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which
variable pricing can make renewable energy more cost effective in the state of
Hawaii. It uses a novel model of power supply and demand that simultaneous-
ly optimizes investment in generation capacity, storage capacity, and real-time
operation of the system, a demand system that accounts for interhour elasticity
and overall demand elasticity. Lastly, chapter 4 investigates on the extent to
which the switching improves households well-being. Using a nationwide transi-
tion from kerosene to cleaner burning propane in Indonesia, the same program
as in chapter 2, I investigate households consumption response to fuel switching.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”Energy is crucial for achieving almost all of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals, from its role in the eradication of poverty through ad-
vancements in health, education, water supply and industrialization, to
combating climate change.”(Economic and Council, 2016)
The seventh United Nation Sustainable Development Goals is to ensure access to
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030. Although the
importance of the modern energy is emphasized as in above quote, the proportion
of the worlds population with access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking
has only increased from 51 per cent in 2000 to 58 per cent in 2014. Similarly, the
share of renewable energy such as biofuels, wind, solar PV, hydropower has also
increased slowly, from 17.4 per cent in 2000 to 18.1 per cent in 2012 (Economic
and Council, 2016). Although we are progressing, we are still far away from
achieving the goal. One reason beneath the slow progress is that there is not
enough rigorous analysis on the cost and benefit of having cleaner energy. This
creates uncertainty to the policy makers on what kind of intervention that are
cost-effective. Growing concern about all forms of air pollution, as different forms
of it are increasingly linked to poor health outcomes and lower productivity, as
well as other ecological and environmental impacts. When we dicuss about the
economic cost of air pollution, the impact on mortality as reflected by the Value
of Statistical Live (VSL) is predominant. Up until now, we have not been able
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to know precisely by how much. The most recent estimation by the World Bank
and team, air pollution costs more than USD 5 trillion in welfare losses (Bank
and IHME, 2016). That is about the size of the gross domestic product of India,
Canada, and Mexico. Good news that the cost of renewable energy technology
like wind, solar PV, and batteries are falling, the cost of clean air is likely not as
high as it is used to be.
My dissertation considers different aspects of changing costs and benefits of
cleaner air, and how these changes affect welfare. A well designed policy depends
critically to the extend that the benefit exceed the cost and how it compares
to any other policy alternatives. Here I discuss two very different context, the
cost of renewable energy in developed countries, and the benefits of switching
to cleaner fuel in developing countries. This work aim to better inform policy
makers about the alternative policies and its associated cost and benefit. I find
that having fuel switching policy is welfare improving. Similarly having dynamic
pricing is always welfare improving compared to flat pricing.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of a household fuel conversion program on infant
mortality by examining a kerosene to liquid petroleum gas (LPG) conversion
program, one of the largest household energy transition projects ever attempted
in the developing world. In 2007, the government of Indonesia introduced this
transition program to encourage more than 50 million households to switching
from kerosene to Liquid Petroleum gas (LPG). Burning dirty fuel such as kerosene
is the leading source of indoor air pollution and can be more severe compared
to outdoor air pollution as the exposure is much greater and the fact that most
people spend their time indoor. Based on exposure measurement studies, LPG
produces significantly less indoor air pollutants compare to kerosene. I find a
reduction in infant mortality and lower probability of being born with very low
birth weight, with effects considerably larger for households where cooking is
done indoors. This results suggest the importance of cleaner fuel interventions.
Even a little improvement of indoor air pollution, a switch from kerosene to LPG,
can lead to a reduction in mortality. A larger improvement in indoor air pollution
(i.e. switching away from wood fuel to LPG) might save even more.
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Chapter 3 examines the extent to which variable pricing can make renewable
energy more cost effective in the state of Hawaii. Technological progress has low-
ered the cost of wind and solar power to make them competitive with coal and
natural gas on a levelized basis. The problem having more renewable energy is
the intermitency, which makes the supply side a lot more inelastic. One solution
to intermittency is real-time retail pricing that reflects the incremental cost and
marginal willingness to pay for electricity. This pricing scheme would create pow-
erful incentives to efficiently store energy on a distributed basis or otherwise shift
consumption from times and places of relatively scarce renewable supply to times
and places of plenty. Electricity consumers already have access to many low-cost
appliances and devices that store energy in different forms. By carefully timing
water heating, electric vehicle charging and water pumping, using ice storage for
cooling systems, making micro-adjustments for some kinds of refrigeration, or
other means, electricity use can be shifted from seconds to many hours at low
cost. Such mechanisms would need to be automated by smart devices acting
on customers’ behalf. These technologies can make electricity demand highly
substitutable over time, at least over horizons up to a day or so. In addition to
shifting the timing of electricity consumption within the day, customers facing
dynamic prices can also adjust the total amount of power they consume each day,
reducing total consumption during extended periods when power is scarce, or in-
creasing it when power is abundant. Hawaii has a natural advantage in adoption
of large shares of renewable energy, with plentiful renewable resources and expen-
sive conventional generation. However, the intermittency challenge is especially
acute in Hawaii, due to the states geographic concentration. This chapter shows
that variable pricing provides little social benefit when we have less renewable
energy, but it provides significantly more as the renewable share increases.
Chapter 4 investigates on the extent to which the switching improves house-
holds well-being. Burning dirty cooking fuels produces harmful air pollutants
and has long been associated with poor health and low productivity. Policies
that aim to improve modern energy access, including the seventh United Na-
tion’s Sustainable Development Goal, have been moving slowly, leaving half of
the world population without access to clean cooking fuel. The desirability to
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switch to a cleaner fuel depends critically on the extent to which the switching
improves households well-being. Using a nationwide transition from kerosene to
cleaner burning propane in Indonesia, the same program as in chapter 2, I in-
vestigate households response to fuel switching. Based on combustion efficiency
and end-use energy equivalence, LPG is cleaner and more efficient than kerosene.
Using variation in the timing of the implementation on four waves of the Indone-
sia longitudinal survey, I compare changes in expenditure within households in
the treated districts with changes in expenditure within households in not-yet
treated districts. I find that households reduce their kerosene consumption up
to 100% and their fuel expenses are reduced by 40%, or 1.19 USD per month
on average. These effects are higher among poor households. I do not find any
response to other nondurable expenditures which provides some evidence of con-
sumption smoothing. This is as expected considering the size of the effect is
only about a 2% reduction from total monthly expenditure. As fuel demand is
inelastic, a small cost saving might indicate big welfare improvement. Adding to
the literature of the benefit of switching to a cleaner fuel, the overall impact of
this on-going fuel switching intervention can be enormous.
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Chapter 2
Cooking Fuel and Early Life
Health: Lesson from Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
In most developing countries, cooking fuels emit indoor air pollutants that may
lead to poor health. The World Health Organization claims that dirty cooking
fuels are associated with approximately 4.3 million premature deaths each year
and pose health risks comparable to the hazards of smoking tobacco (WHO,
2016). But the magnitude of this correlation varies widely across studies, and a
causal link has not been clearly established (Jeuland et al., 2015). Household be-
havior, among other factors, obscures health impacts. For example, the largest
randomized control trial found no effect from free use of new, cleaner cooking
stoves, because households used them irregularly and inappropriately (Hanna
et al., 2016). People may also take actions to avoid inhaling smoke or partic-
ulate matter, especially when the pollutants are obvious and cause discomfort.
In cross-sectional studies, risks of alternative fuels and cooking stoves can be
confounded by the use of multiple fuels, not all of which may be reported, plus
many unobserved factors that may be associated with cooking choices (Duflo
et al., 2008).
In this paper, I evaluate whether cleaner cooking fuel affects health outcomes,
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focusing mainly on infant mortality. The study provides quasi-experimental ev-
idence on the health benefits of switching to a cleaner cooking fuel, leveraging
what may be the largest kerosene to liquid petroleum gas conversion program ever
attempted in a developing country. The Indonesian government determined the
location and timing of program implementation based on each regions’ kerosene
usage and its infrastructure readiness. Then, the government redirected kerosene
subsidy budgets to LPG, a more efficient and cleaner fuel compared to kerosene1.
This program, motivated mainly by a rising governmental cost of subsidizing
kerosene, successfully reduced household use of kerosene by 83% in just 4 years.
I use three rounds of Indonesian Demographic and Health Surveys (2002,
2007 and 2012) and compare changes in infant mortality in the targeted districts
to changes in infant mortality in untargeted districts. The identification strat-
egy assumes that timing of program implementation is uncorrelated with other
changes after 2008, conditional on district fixed effects, cohort fixed effects and
household level controls.
The main threat to causal identification is that timing of program imple-
mentation might have been associated with unobserved factors that otherwise
influenced infant mortality in the targeted regions. To address this threat, first,
I show that similar pre-implementation trends in infant mortality existed in both
targeted and untargeted districts. Second, I show that implementation timing
has no association with trends in birth rates or household characteristics. These
results offer reassurance that untargeted regions serve as a valid counterfactual.
I further examine the results’ robustness by using different specifications such as
household fixed effects, coarsened exact matching (Blackwell et al., 2009), and
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). I also test for the
sensitivity of the results to including trends in household level controls, trends in
regional and provincial level for local policy changes, as well as several placebo
treatments.
1It is widely known that LPG produces significantly less PM2.5 than kerosene because of higher com-
bustion efficiency and PM2.5 exhibits higher toxicity per unit mass than larger particulates (i.e.
PM5 and PM10) (Peters et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2005).
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I find that the program led to an increase in LPG use in place of kerosene
and had no effect on the use of wood fuel. Four fewer infants died per 10,000 live
births – a 1.1 percentage points reduction in infant mortality rate – than would
have in the absence of the program. Approximately 600 infants were saved per
year from 86 million kerosene users in the targeted regions. In the developing
world, one billion kerosene users switching to LPG can save about 7,000 infants
per year.
To also explore the mechanisms underlying these impacts on health, I look
separately at the effects before and after birth. I consider pre-birth effects using
the incidence of stillbirth, preterm birth and low birth weight as the outcome
variables. I find that a reduction in the fetus exposure to the kerosene pollutants
leads to a significant decrease in low birth weight that is not due to shorter
gestation. I then consider effects of kerosene exposure after birth by estimating
impacts infant and neonatal mortality conditional on birth weight and prenatal
visits. I find the effect on infant mortality is driven mainly by fewer deaths
during the first seven days after birth, which combined with the pre-birth effects,
suggests that fetal exposure during pregnancy is the main mechanism.
I then consider accumulated effects from reduced kerosene exposure. Long-
term exposure to kerosene has been associated with persistent damage to the
pulmonary system (Ritchie et al., 2003). In line with this literature, I find that
households that switched to LPG earlier experienced a larger reduction in in-
fant mortality. This result could be driven by earlier adopters having higher
incomes. Hence, I further test if low-socioeconomic households benefited more
by the reduction in kerosene exposure. Poorer households may be less able to
avoid exposure and/or less knowledgeable about potential health effects. I find
that the reduction in infant mortality is stronger in infants living in rural areas
and infants from low educated mothers. It is also stronger for households who
cook inside the house as the health risk of burning dirty fuel is higher when the
air circulation is poor.
This study adds a rare and thus valuable evidence on the effect of indoor air
7
pollution on infant mortality in the developing countries literature2. Globally,
approximately one billion people rely on kerosene and other polluting devices for
lighting (WHO, 2016) and 500 million households use it for cooking (Lam et al.,
2012). Adding to Barron and Torero (2017) which provides the first experimental
evidence of a reduction in the kerosene usage leading to a lower acute respiratory
infection among young children, I provide the first quasi-experimental evidence
of a reduction in kerosene usage to infant mortality. Links with infant mortality
are more plausibly causal because infants spend most of their time indoor, and
have low migration rates, and are not subjected to the accumulated effect from
unknown lifetime exposure to pollution (Chay and Greenstone, 2003). I can
also hypothesize that switching from solid fuel, which is dirtier than kerosene,
to LPG may bring even greater health benefits. This study suggests that policy
interventions on subsidizing cleaner cooking fuel is one way to achieve the United
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides some back-
ground about cooking fuels and associated indoor air pollution in developing
countries, program details and previous literature on kerosene and health; sec-
tion 3 provides research design and data details; section 4 shows the results and
robustness checks; section 5 discusses policy implication; and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Policy context of clean energy access
The seventh Sustainable Development Goal calls for universal access to afford-
able, reliable, sustainable and modern energy by 2030. In 2009, 1.3 billion people
lack access to electricity (Barron and Torero, 2017) and, in 2010, 41 percent of
households worldwide relied on dirty fuel for cooking (Bonjour et al., 2013). Inter-
ventions in clean energy need to be scaled up significantly to support this agenda.
There are at least two common clean energy interventions to reduce indoor ex-
posure to pollutants from burning dirty fuel: providing access to cleaner fuels
2The link between PM2.5 from outdoor air pollution and infants’ health in developed countries has
been well documented (see Currie et al. (2009)).
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and providing access to improved stoves. Investment costs and sustainability are
among important considerations.
For the impoverished, kerosene is an expensive fuel (Trollinger, 2016). In
mostly developing countries, it has been highly subsidized with $18 billion total
subsidies per year (Mills, 2017). Globally, approximately one billion people rely
on kerosene and other polluting devices for lighting (WHO, 2016) and 500 million
households use it for cooking (Lam et al., 2012). For the first time, WHO re-
classified kerosene as a dirty fuel, within the same category for biomass and coal
(WHO, 2016). The link between kerosene use and health become increasingly
important. In a response, interventions to replace kerosene with cleaner fuel such
as LPG has been increasingly popular in North Africa, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador,
Brazil, India, China, Malaysia, Thailand, and, among others, Indonesia(Pachauri
et al., 2012; Toft et al., 2016).
Indonesia’s kerosene to LPG program, a unique policy intervention in house-
hold conversion, combines price subsidy and quantity restriction in the interven-
tion. The switching to LPG is ’involuntary’ in nature because the subsidized
kerosene is removed from the targeted regions after LPG distribution. Mainly
motivated to reduce the kerosene subsidy3 , this conversion led to a reduction
in 8.7 billion litres of subsidized kerosene or approximately 83% from total sub-
sidized kerosene in 2007. From the census data, within only three years, the
percentage of households who use primarily kerosene dropped significantly from
42% to 12%, and the percentage of households who use primarily LPG sharply
increased from 9% to 46% (Figure 2.1).
2.2.1 Fuel Conversion Program in Indonesia
There was a need to rush in reducing the kerosene subsidy which took half of
the government’s oil budget. Hence, the May 2007 kerosene to LPG Program
commenced after only 8 months of simple feasibility study and one-month of
3Indonesian government acknowledged other benefits from this program such as efficiency and envi-
ronmental benefit.
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Figure 2.1: Households’ cooking fuel choice before and after the program
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of household based on their primary cooking fuel in targeted and
untargeted regions before the program (2005) and after the program (2010). The proportion of household
who use kerosene decreased from 42% to 12%; LPG – increased from 9% to 46%, wood – slightly decreased
from 46% to 40%. Electricity has very small portion of users. Source: Indonesian census 2005 & 2010.
market trial. The program plan has continuously improved after the official
Presidential Decree released on December 20074. Since most regions that have
access to kerosene are mostly electrified, kerosene is used by households mainly
for cooking rather than lighting. Before the program started, kerosene was highly
subsidized, on average, 62% of the market price, approximately $0.41 per litre
while LPG was not yet subsidized and priced at $ 0.77 per kg in 20075. After
the program, LPG is available in 3 kg size with the subsidized price of $0.42 per
kg6. By adjusting the energy expenditures with price-to-kWh conversion factor
and the fuel efficiency factor, Andadari et al. (2014) shows that the program
was effective in reducing the percentage of people living under the lowest energy-
poverty line but failed to substantially reduce the overall number of energy-poor
people7.
4http://prokum.esdm.go.id/perpres/2007/perpres_104_2007.pdf
51 litre kerosene ≈ 0.4 kg LPG (Budya and Arofat, 2011)
6Details of the program can be read in Budya and Arofat (2011).
7The study is based on a survey on 550 households in five subdistricts in Central Java in January
2010.
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The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources selects the treated districts
in a given fiscal year based on each district’s level of kerosene usage, LPG infras-
tructure readiness, location and size of the area. Pertamina (Indonesia’s national
oil company) acts as the sole executor for the conversion program. The program
was aimed to convert 73% of households8, targeting households that use kerosene.
Only eligible households9 received one initial free LPG package (one LPG can-
ister, a single LPG stove, hose and regulator) and allowed to refill the canister
under the subsidized price. Table 2.1 shows that by 2008, the package had been
distributed to 84 districts, mainly big cities in Java. By 2011, the program has
reached out to now include 169 districts (out of 354). Figure 2.2 shows the pro-
gram roll-out during 2007-2011. The colored area represents treated districts and
the year in which the free LPG package was distributed while the white area rep-
resents the untreated regions. Initially, these untreated regions, mainly eastern
Indonesia, were completely excluded due to infrastructure unreadiness and high
transportation costs but recently they are being considered to be included in the
future.
Table 2.1: Number of districts based on program roll-out
Regions
Program year
Total districts
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Sumatera 24 1 4 24 15 35 103
Java 0 22 59 32 1 0 114
Bali and Nusa Tenggara 17 1 3 5 0 4 30
Kalimantan 15 0 0 7 4 13 39
Sulawesi 17 0 0 15 6 8 46
Maluku and Papua 22 0 0 0 0 0 22
Total 95 24 66 83 26 60 354
Figure 2.2.1 shows the supply quantity of subsidized kerosene relative to base
year (base year for kerosene is 2006 while base year for LPG is 2012). Kerosene
supply decreased and LPG supply increased gradually starting from January
2008. During 2007-2008, Pertamina faced serious field challenges such as strong
resistance from the community (mass protests and negative public opinion in
842 millions from 57 million total households in 2007
9Eligible households are households who have been using kerosene and have never use LPG before.
There is a third-party surveyor assigned to do the collect data from eligible households.
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Figure 2.2: Program placement by end of 2011
Notes: by 2008, the free initial LPG packages were distributed in mainly Java, and Bali. By 2011, they were
distributed in some part in Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. White coloured regions
has not yet distributed after 2011. Source: constructed by author based on LPG realization data from
Pertamina
the media10) and a simultaneous kerosene and LPG scarcity which then led to a
significant rise in both kerosene and LPG prices11. During the price spike, some
households used multiple fuels, including wood, to fulfill their daily energy needs
(Hasanudin et al., 2011; Andadari et al., 2014).
2.2.2 Potential impact of kerosene usage on productivity
and health
Literature has mainly focused on the adverse health risks from burning solid fuels
rather than kerosene since solid fuel pollutants are obvious and cause greater dis-
comfort. Although kerosene smoke is less visible, burning kerosene shows similar
adverse health risk to those of solid fuels’ (Pokhrel et al., 2010; Lam et al., 2012).
Compared to LPG, kerosene produces significantly more fine particles (PM2.5)
due to lower combustion efficiency (Smith et al., 2005). In particular, it emits a
very high level of black carbon, a chemical speciation of PM2.5, which is associat-
10There were also many accidents involving LPG explosions being reported in the media
11The kerosene scarcity led to severe inflation (Budya and Arofat, 2011)
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Figure 2.3: Monthly quantity of subsidized kerosene and LPG
Notes: Supply of subsidized kerosene is relative to 2006 quantity. Supply of subsidized LPG is relative to
2012 quantity. Source: Pertamina.
ed with lung cancer, and cardiovascular mortality, morbidity, and likely adverse
birth and nervous system effectsWHO et al. (2012); Grahame et al. (2014).
Combustion products from burning kerosene have been indicated as poten-
tial mutagens and carcinogens. They are also capable of interfering with the
development of an embryo fetus (Maiyoh et al., 2015). In a group of children
with cancer, exposure to kerosene stoves on pregnant mothers is highly associated
with occurrence of brain tumors in young children (Bunin et al., 1994). Carcino-
genic effects of particulates from benzene, one of the combustion products from
burning kerosene, has been found to increase incidence of acute non-lymphocytic
leukaemia (Duarte-Davidson et al., 2001). Toxicants such as n-Hexane, naph-
thalenes, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) from burning kerosene
were also found to have neurotoxicity effects (Ritchie et al., 2003), which are
likely to reduce postnatal growth.
Cooking with kerosene has particularly different behavioral responses. House-
holds who use kerosene are more likely to cook indoors, to cook for longer du-
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rations, and to cook closer to the stoves compared to when they use solid fuels.
This is because kerosene burns more cleanly compared to solid fuels and produces
significantly less amount of smoke (Saksena et al., 2003). Moreover, some Ran-
domized Control Trials (RCT) find that when cooking is more comfortable with
cleaner fuels or cleaner cooking stoves, households are likely to cook more food
and more frequently (Burwen and Levine, 2012; Hanna and Oliva, 2015). Hence,
when their fuel consumption increases, it is unclear whether their exposure to
indoor air pollutant decreases. Even less is known about household’s energy mix
and the factors that motivate the households to adopt them. For this reason,
RCT, which focus on the effectiveness of existing interventions under tightly con-
trolled conditions, may not provide the most useful information for large-scale
interventions.
To what extent does burning kerosene lead to infant deaths has not yet clearly
established. Association between kerosene usage and health outcomes from cross-
sectional studies does very little in explaining the magnitude of the relationship.
RCT studies do not find any health improvement from cleaner cooking stove
interventions because households do not use the stoves consistently and properly
Hanna et al. (2016). One main drawback in providing cleaner cooking stoves is
the non-compliance issue. Households can revert back to using the old stoves
(Burwen and Levine, 2012). Households also choose their cooking fuels based on
the most economically available fuels, despite of any additional cash incentives
given to encourage cleaner fuels usage (Hanna and Oliva, 2015).
This study, however, has an important feature of ’involuntary’ fuel switching
induced by the kerosene subsidy removal. The program design does minimize the
rate of non-compliance, anecdotally. The study makes it more likely to document
the link between kerosene usage and infant mortality. Although the issue of non-
compliance still exists, like in any other intervention, it is important that this
study incorporates such behavioral responses in the estimation.
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2.3 Research Design
Common cross-sectional analysis does not fully address the potential confounder
due to the non-randomness of fuel choice. To address this, I use a quasi-experimental
approach, exploiting the sharp variation of fuel choice induced by the fuel conver-
sion program to rule out the endogeneity bias. The main objective is to estimate
the causal effect of the program on infant mortality. In pollution and health
literature, to avoid the ’curse of dimensionality’, I assume that covariates are
linear and additive, following Chay and Greenstone (2003). I use difference-in-
differences (DID) estimation strategy and compare within district and birth year
average infant mortality rate between targeted and untargeted regions, following
below equation:
yirt = c+ αr + βt + θTreatmentrt + τXirt + irt (2.1)
where yirt be the outcome variable for infant i in region r at time t which takes
the value of 1 if the infant died and 0 otherwise. αr and βt are district and year of
birth fixed effects to control for permanent unobserved differences across districts
and cohorts. Xirt is a set of covariates that capture birth, parental and household
characteristics. irt is the error term. Treatmentrt is a dummy indicating the
program status in district r in year t. The average treatment effect is captured
by the θ coefficient.
Even though the outcome variable is binary, I use the linear probability
model for the ease of interpretation. One drawback of using the linear probability
model is that the estimated coefficients can imply probabilities outside the unit
interval [0,1]. Since the main interest is to estimate the partial effect of the
program to the infant mortality rate, averaged across the distribution of the
program, then the fact that some predicted values are outside the unit interval
may not be very important (Wooldridge, 2010). On the other hand, with fixed
effects probit models, one needs to make arbitrary assumptions on the value of
fixed effects to calculate marginal effects of the independent variables. For the
robustness, conditional probit estimation confirms that the signs and significance
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of the relevant coefficients hold.
Ideally, births should be matched to the district, month and year of the
program implementation. But the data on the program implementation does not
have this level of timing detail. In addition, the actual fuel switching is influenced
by the timing of initial LPG distribution and the subsequent timing of subsidized
kerosene withdrawal which could be varied in the actual implementation. Hence,
I explore two approaches. First, I assume the LPG distribution was spread
equally throughout the year; then I match births that occurred in the second
half of the implementation year as the treatment group12. Second, I exclude the
first year of the program implementation; then I match births that occurred in
the subsequent year as the treatment group. As the results are very similar (see
Section 2.4.5), I use the first approach to present the main result to maintain the
sample size.
Following the WHO definition, infant mortality rate is defined as the number
of deaths of children under one year of age. Infants are one of the main interests
of policy makers as the economic loss from future outcomes might be larger than
those of adults (Currie et al., 2009). Moreover, infant mortality rate has been
indicated as a superior measurement in the air pollution literature compared to
the other alternatives such as adults’ health or children’s health. In fact, the
exposure level from household air pollution is highly varied and its lifetime accu-
mulated impact is unknown. Infants not only spend most of their time indoors,
are particularly more vulnerable to environmental risk, and have relatively low
migration rates, but also have not yet been exposed to an unknown lifetime of
pollution compared to adults (Chay and Greenstone, 2003). Hence, using infant
mortality rate as an outcome variable is helpful for identification purposes. In
the main analysis, I also explore if there is a disproportionate impact on fetuses
and new borns, later called perinatal mortality13.
12I tried different monthly births cut-off ranges that occurred in February to October, and the results
are insensitive to this cut off. The effect does look more precise starting with the third month
(see Appendix A)
13Perinatal mortality is defined as the number of stillbirths and deaths in the first week of life.
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The program status in this research design identifies the impact of the pro-
gram on the individual outcomes in the particular sample used in the regression.
It is noteworthy that the data is not informative about the precise fuel mix
and the exact time of fuel switching. Fuel stacking (e.g. when households used
both kerosene and wood but reported wood as their primary cooking fuel) is a
common practice. In response, my estimation in this study is equivalent to the
intent-to-treat (ITT) effect. If fuel choice induced by the program is uncorre-
lated to expected birth outcomes, the magnitude of all estimates would have to
be multiplied by one over the share of targeted population in order to get to an
average treatment effect (ATE). 14
2.3.1 Data and Variables
2.3.1.1 Demographic and Health Survey
For health outcomes, I use three rounds of the Indonesian Demographic and
Health Surveys (IDHS) (2002, 2007, 2012). IDHS 2007 and 2012 include all
provinces (33 regions and 354 districts) whereas IDHS 2002 excludes 4 regions:
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalom, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua due to unstable
political situation. Census blocks in urban and rural areas were selected using
multistage-stratified sampling for each province. The response rates for both
household and individual interviews were 99% on average. Women who have
ever been married (15-49 years old) and household heads were asked about all
birth information within five years preceding the survey, as well as maternal
and household characteristics. DHS has information for all births within the
household. I use this to check for robustness in section 2.4.5. Since pregnancy-
related variables are recorded only for children born within the last five years,
the main analysis is limited to range in order to have a comparable sample size
14ITT gives a pragmatic estimate of the benefit of the policy rather than the actual measurement of
fuel switching. The prevalence in ITT analysis is that it accounts for non-compliance and fuel
stacking. Fuel stacking is a common issue in survey-based studies in other countries since survey
data only captures household primary cooking fuel.
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between models with different control variables. Sampling weights provided in
the survey are not used in the main regression since I focus on estimating the
relationships at the individual level.
I define infant mortality as the death within one year to account for heaping
(see Figure B.2 in Appendix)15. Common reporting issues include recall error
and survivor bias. First, recall error happens when respondents were more likely
to forget distant child births or underreported births when they did not want
to talk about the death of their child. Generally, this problem is less serious
for recent births rather than more distant births. This recall error of births
might lead to attenuation bias, in which case made my estimates a lower bound.
To minimize this problem, I also include dummies for recall period, following
Ngandu et al. (2016). Second, survival bias happens when the survey is limited
to only surviving women at age 15-49. In the case of Indonesia, the survival bias
is likely to be negligible (Indonesia, 2012). But if the fertility of surviving and
non-surviving women differs substantially, and given that no data is available
for children of women who had died, also makes my estimates serve as a lower
bound.
The base regression includes dummies for birth order, recall period, and sin-
gleton and multiple birth. Following the literature and considering non-missing
values to maintain a comparable sample size, the set of control variables includes
dummies for mother’s and spouse’s education, mother’s age at birth, a dummy
for young mothers (i.e. mothers younger than 18 years old), parents’ smoking
behaviour, parents’ visits to the health facility in the last 12 months, safe drink-
ing water sources (i.e. water from protected wells, water pipe built inside the
dwellings, bottled water or filtered water), availability of private toilets, electri-
fications, ownership of fridge and TV, and a dummy for the firstborns .
The empirical analysis focuses on comparing changes in birth outcomes within
targeted and untargeted regions after 2008 with the total sample of 39,348 ob-
servations. I exclude 12,133 births between 2007-2008 because of two reasons.
15Technical definition of infant mortality is the death happen less than one year but the heaping of
deaths at age 1 month and 12 months are common in the survey.
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First, starting from 2009, the program was operated smoothly without major
operational issues (Budya and Arofat, 2011). Before that, during 2007-2008
the program has significant operational problems as discussed in Section 2.2.1.
Moreover, during 2007-2008, the program also heavily targeted big cities, densely
populated regions with a high level of kerosene consumption. Excluding these
regions helps to exclude the ’unintended consequences’ from those operational
problems and improves the comparability between targeted and untargeted re-
gions. Second, this selected sample excludes the period of financial crisis that
happened between 2007-2008.
Overall, the treatment group after 2008 is more similar to the control group
in many observed characteristics16. I acknowledge that DID estimation only as-
sumes that the infant mortality in targeted regions will have similar trends with
the untargeted regions in the absence of the program, regardless of their initial
characteristics. In fact, the previous study on the impact of financial crisis in
Indonesia indicates that regions were affected differently based on regions’ char-
acteristics (Levinsohn et al., 2003). It is therefore useful, in this case, to compare
treatment and control groups that have similarity both in initial characteristics
and trends as they are likely to be effected equally by the crisis. Finally, I also
add the robustness checks that include all the sample (including previously ex-
cluded regions) in Section 2.4.5. I show that the inclusion of the excluded groups
gives similar results but larger standard errors.
Supplemental data for district variations are taken from Indonesia Database
for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER)17, an integrated panel dataset
of infrastructure, fiscal, economic, social and demographic at district level col-
lected by The World Bank though many sources. District level variables mainly
come from PODES, a census of all villages and towns in Indonesia. Matching the
district variable to the main data set is challenge as the district data is limited on
certain year of survey. In 52 million LPG packages were distributed and 64% of it
16The comparison between targeted and untargeted districts is provided in the Appendix Table A.1
(for district characteristics) and Table A.2 (for household characteristics).
17https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/indonesia-database-for-policy-and-economic-research
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was distributed in 2009-2011 to 163 districts. From a separate trend analysis on
district variation overtime, there is very small variation in district characteristics
before and after the program (see Appendix A.1) thus the analysis is focused on
using district fixed effects that will account for any permanent difference between
districts.
2.3.2 Validity of the empirical strategy
I assume that the program status is not correlated with other changes after the
program, conditional on district and year of birth fixed effects, and household
level controls. The targeted regions and the timing of the program are determined
by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources independently from any other
major national programs (discussed in Section 2.2.1). The remaining concern,
however, is if (1) there is a systematic difference in the pre-existing trend in infant
mortality, and/or (2) there is a correlation between the program status and any
other factors that also correlated with infant mortality after the program. If
these two hypotheses cannot be rejected, then the assumption may not be valid.
I test these two hypotheses in following sections.
2.3.2.1 Similarity in pre-implementation trends
First, using only 2002 and 2007 survey, I present average household characteristics
at the baseline years from the regression equation below:
zirt = c+ αr + β0S2007 + γ0Tr + θ0S2007 ∗ Tr + irt (2.2)
where S2007 is an indicator for 2007 survey and Tr is an indicator for targeted
districts. Table 2.2 column 1 reports average characteristics for households in the
untargeted districts (i.e. control group). Column 2 reports average characteristics
of households in the targeted districts (i.e. treatment group). Column 3 reports
the within-district mean differences between households in columns 1 and 2 (γ0).
Column 4 reports within-district trends between households in columns 1 and 2
(θ0). The table shows 40% (34 million people) used kerosene as their primary
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cooking fuel and 10% (8 million people) already used LPG. Within districts,
there is no significant change during 2002 and 2007.
Across districts, households in the targeted districts are more educated and
economically better (e.g., they are more likely to own TV, fridge, private toilet,
and electricity). The initial number of children born in the last five years pre-
ceding each survey year is higher for the targeted districts than the untargeted,
but there is no difference in the trend. At 10% significance level, children in the
targeted regions were more likely to be born with low weights. The coefficient of
the number of antenatal visits in column (4) indicates less antenatal visits in the
targeted districts. In fact, this negative coefficient is due to an upward trend in
antenatal visits in the untargeted districts which might be because of the gradual
improvements in the regional infrastructure overtime18. Overall, within distric-
t differences, households in the targeted districts generally are similar both in
initial characteristics and trends.
Figure 2.4 shows the mean of infant mortality rate for the treated and un-
treated groups. The x-axis indicates the year of birth. Vertical dash line shows
the beginning of 2009 which is the start of the program implementation. Infant
mortality rate in both groups show a similar downward pre-trend. Note that
year-to-year trends are subjected to a considerable amount of noise. The 2012
survey ended in the July of 2012 thus only has six months of birth records.
2.3.2.2 Correlation with other characteristics
Second, using all sample, I test if the program correlates with other households’
observable characteristics following below Eq. 2.3. Each row in Table 2.3 reports
a within district regression on each corresponding dependent variable. There are
no noticeable differential change over time in birth and household characteristics
except the proportion of non-smoker is increased about 1 percent at the 10%
18Note that antenatal visits are only recorded for the latest child born in the survey.
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Table 2.2: Baseline characteristics between treatment and control group
Mean Within-district
Control group Treatment group Level differences Trend differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total observations 11,195 14,667
Cooking fuel choice
LPG 0.06 (0.23) 0.30 (0.46) 0.07 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01)
Kerosene 0.27 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) -0.05 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02)
Wood 0.67 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49) -0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02)
Birth outcomes
Infant death 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Perinatal death 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01* (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Low weight (¡2500 g) 3.16 (0.62) 3.17 (0.56) 0.04 (0.05) 0.02* (0.02)
Birth weight (in kilogram) 0.15 (0.36) 0.12 (0.33) -0.11* (0.06) 0.00 (0.03)
Birth characteristics
Antenatal visits 6.16 (3.76) 7.63 (3.70) -0.68 (0.61) -0.48** (0.23)
Age at birth 27.77 (6.43) 27.70 (6.30) -0.08 (0.71) -0.05 (0.25)
Mother’s age <19 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
First birth 0.30 (0.46) 0.37 (0.48) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02)
Child born in the last 5 years 1.48 (0.63) 1.28 (0.50) 0.14** (0.05) -0.03 (0.03)
Household characteristics
Number of household member 5.84 (2.42) 5.34 (2.03) 0.13 (0.23) -0.07 (0.10)
Has TV 0.51 (0.50) 0.78 (0.42) 0.02 (0.05) -0.03 (0.02)
Has fridge 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46) 0.12 (0.13) 0.01 (0.02)
Has clean water for drinking 0.21 (0.41) 0.37 (0.48) 0.26 (0.20) 0.03 (0.03)
Visited health facility last 12 months 0.51 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) -0.18 (0.12) 0.03 (0.04)
Do not smoke 0.98 (0.15) 0.99 (0.12) -0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Do not have own toilet 0.66 (0.47) 0.48 (0.50) -0.06 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03)
Has electricity 0.73 (0.45) 0.94 (0.23) 0.03 (0.08) -0.02 (0.03)
Parents’ education
Mother: secondary and higher 0.45 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.00 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02)
Spouse: secondary and higher 0.55 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.04 (0.05) -0.03 (0.02)
Notes: Column 1 reports average characteristics for household in the control group: untreated districts. Column 2 reports average characteristics
of household in the treatment group: treated districts. Column 3 reports the within-district mean differences between households in column 1
and 2 (γ0 in Eq. 2.2). Column 4 reports within-district trends between households in column 1 and 2 (θ0 in Eq. 2.2). All regressions include
district fixed effects. a Antenatal visits variable is recorded for the latest birth thus have a smaller sample. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the district level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
significance level.
zirt = c+ αr + β1S2012 + γ1Tr + θ1S2012 ∗ Tr + irt (2.3)
The results in both Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide support that the pro-
gram does not lead to any differential change other than to infant mortality.
In other words, the untargeted districts are likely a valid counterfactual for the
targeted districts in the absence of the program. Although there is no direct
test of exogeneity that can be done, the absence of significant correlation with
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Figure 2.4: Trend of Infant Mortality per 1,000 births
Notes: The figure plots the mean of infant mortality rate in treated districts and untreated districts
after 2008. X-axis indicates the beginning of the year of birth. Vertical dash line shows the beginning
2009 which is the start of the program implementation. Note that year-to-year trend in mortality
rates is subjected to a considerable amount of noise.
the main observable characteristics could suggest that there is neither significant
correlation with unobservable variables (Tanaka, 2015).
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Impacts on Fuel Choices
Table 2.4 shows that the program, on average, led to a 10 percent decrease in
the kerosene use, a 9 percent increase in the LPG use, and no effect on the wood
use. This is unsurprising, given that wood users are not eligible for the program.
It is possible that wood users may have illegally obtained subsidized LPG but
the result in column (3) shows that this is not the case. Wood users likely do
not have incentive to switch to LPG as wood fuel is the cheapest compared to
all fuel alternatives and can be obtained with almost zero monetary cost.
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Table 2.3: The effect on household characteristics
Dependent variables
Treated district Treated district Mean of dep. Observations R-squared
X Program (θ1) (β1) variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household characteristics
Number of household member -0.17 (0.12) 0.41* (0.23) 5.41 39,348 0.08
Has TV -0.02 (0.03) 0.07 (0.08) 0.69 39,305 0.23
Has fridge 0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.06) 0.29 39,226 0.19
Has clean water for drinking 0.02 (0.04) 0.14 (0.13) 0.32 39,338 0.24
Visited health facility last 12 months 0.01 (0.04) -0.09 (0.09) 0.49 39,297 0.08
Do not smoke 0.01* (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) 0.98 39,328 0.04
Do not have own toilet -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.05) 0.54 39,294 0.17
Has electricity -0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.08) 0.87 39,291 0.21
Parents’ education
Mother: secondary and higher 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.04) 0.58 39,346 0.12
Spouse: secondary and higher 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.04) 0.60 39,178 0.11
Notes: This table reports two regression coefficients from Eq. 2.3. Column 1 reports the coefficient of the program placement and Column
2 reports the coefficient of treated districts. All regressions include district and survey year fixed effects which were not shown to save
space. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
2.4.2 Impacts on Birth Outcomes
This quasi-experimental setting does not use the main cooking fuel as a regressor
which is endogenous and a major weakness in the earlier literature. Since I do
not use the main cooking fuel variable, I am allowing the estimate to include
fuel-stacking. Table 2.5 reports coefficient θ from Eq. 4.1. Outcome variables in
column (1)-(4) is infant mortality (i.e. infant death within one year) and column
(5)-(8) is perinatal mortality (i.e. stillbirths and infant death within one week).
Column (1) is the most parsimonious model and uses only district and year of
birth fixed effects. Column (2) adds a set of covariates as discussed in Section
2.3.1 to the model used in column (1). Column (3) adds the interaction of all
covariates with dummy program to the model used in column (2) to absorb the
differential trends in household characteristics. In column (4), I replace the birth
year fixed effects used in the three earlier models with month-year of birth fixed
effects.
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Table 2.4: The effect on household’s fuel choice
LPG Kerosene Wood
(1) (2) (3)
Treat 0.362*** -0.344*** -0.017
(0.034) (0.032) (0.028)
Constant 0.104 0.372 0.511
(0.074) (0.065) (0.037)
Mean 0.237 0.291 0.462
R-squared 0.329 0.225 0.283
Notes: This table explores the program effect on the
types of fuel used for cooking. All regressions include
district fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered at the district level. Sample size:
39,348. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. **
Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.5: Policy effect on infant and perinatal mortality
Infant mortality (mean: 36 per 1,000 live births) Perinatal mortality (mean: 18 per 1,000 live births)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment (θ) -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.007** -0.005* -0.007** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.001 0.020 0.216 0.167 -0.026*** -0.004 -0.042*** -0.028
(0.028) (0.031) (0.219) (0.218) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 39,346 38,888 38,888 38,888 39,348 31,355 38,890 38,890
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.053 0.058 0.033 0.019 0.038 0.043
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
ControlsXPost No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Month-year FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Notes: All regressions include district and year of birth fixed effects and report the θ coefficient from Eq. 4.1. Control variables included are
discussed in section 2.3.1. ControlsXPost represents the interaction between all control variables with dummy program. Outcome variables in
column (1)-(4) is infant mortality (i.e. infant death within one year) and column (5)-(8) is perinatal mortality (i.e. stillbirths and infant death
within one week). Only treatment coefficient θ (in percentage points) is shown to conserve space. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by district. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.5 shows that the program lead to 1.1 percentage points decrease in
infant mortality or 4 infants per 10,000 live births. The program also lead to
a 0.7 percentage points decrease in perinatal mortality at 5 percent significance
level or 1.2 infants per 10,000 live births. The estimates are consistent across
models and stronger with month-year fixed effects model (column (4)). Given
that there are not many still birth incidents, the result is for perinatal mortality
is mainly driven by early neonatal death which explain 30% of the infant death.
The coefficients of other control variables (showed in Appendix Table A.3) are
consistent with the broader literature. Highly educated mothers, electrification,
access to clean water for drinking, non-smoking behavior, frequency in visiting
health care in the last one year, all are significantly associated with a reduction to
infant mortality. In line with the literature, young mothers have higher pregnancy
risk which associated with higher infant mortality. The ownership of TV, fridge,
age at birth, age of mother’s at first birth, access to a private toilet and the
spouse’s education are not significantly associated with infant mortality.
This study is the first to estimate infant saved from a reduction in household
air pollution. With a similar estimation strategy, Tanaka (2015) finds that the air
regulation in China led to 3-6 six child per 1,000 births annually. Jayachandran
(2009) find that outdoor air pollution from forest fires in Indonesia lead to 3.5
higher early-life mortality 19. It places my estimates within the lowest range:
0.4 infants per 1,000 births to the outdoor air pollution literature. Note that
this study captures the improvement of the indoor air pollution from kerosene to
LPG which is potentially smaller than any air quality in these studies.
2.4.3 Potential Mechanism
2.4.3.1 Direct effect before and after birth
This section explores if fetals and infants exposure to kerosene pollutant is a
possible mechanism that explains the reduction in infant mortality rate. As dis-
19The estimates is calculated from birth rate and population in year 2000
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cussed in Section 2.2.2, exposure to kerosene stove during pregnancy could affect
fetuses and infants through what often called biological mechanism. The hypoth-
esis is that switching from kerosene to LPG might reduce indoor air pollution
which then improve fetals development and infants’ health after birth. Indoor air
pollutants can only effect fetuses through their mother during pregnancy. On the
other hand, the effect on infants can be an accumulated effects during gestation
period and the effect on the exposure after birth. Following Currie et al. (2009),
I estimate the effect of the program before and after birth. First, I estimate the
effect on health before birth using stillbirths (i.e. fetal deaths in after seventh
month of pregnancy), preterm births (i.e. premature births when the gestational
age is less than eight months), and birth weights (i.e. in grams and in categori-
cal) as the outcome variables. Second, I estimate the effect on infant mortality
conditional on health at birth which is measured by birth weight.
Table 2.6 shows the effect of the program on health before birth in column
(1) - (5) and after birth in column (6) - (7). Each of the column is a separate
regression that include the base model, the set of control variables and its in-
teraction with program dummy on the corresponding outcome variable in each
column header. Before birth, the policy leads to a significant decrease in the
probability of very low weight births (<1500 g) and low weight births (<2500
g). I find that the program has no effect on stillbirths, preterm births, and birth
weight measured in grams. I also do not find any significant effects on the length
of gestation20 which mean that the effect on the probability of very low birth
weight are not due to shorter gestation. Note that selection bias might lead to
underestimation. For example, low weight infants from poor households are less
likely to have their weight recorded due to poor delivery facilities21. If this is the
case then my estimate serves as a lower bound.
20Result is available upon request
21In fact, 26% of births in the sample have missing value in their weight at birth.
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Table 2.6: The program effect before and after birth
Before birth After birth
Stillbirth Preterm birth Weight (grams) Weight <1500 g Weight <2500 g Death w/in 1 yr Death w/in 7 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment (θ) 0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.004* -0.016* -0.006* -0.004**
(0.001) (0.007) (0.016) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.005 0.032 2.494*** 0.008 1.013*** 0.000 0.024
(0.005) (0.233) (0.152) (0.011) (0.099) (0.026) (0.016)
Observations 31,355 31,355 23,896 23,896 23,896 23,896 23,896
R-squared 0.014 0.023 0.084 0.033 0.067 0.035 0.035
ControlsXPost Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth weight No No No No No Yes Yes
Antenatal visitsXPost Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the θ coefficient from Eq. 4.1 and shows the effect of the program on health before birth in column (1) - (5) and after birth in column
(6) - (7). Each of the column is a separate regression that include the base model, the set of control variables and its interaction with program dummy on the
corresponding outcome variable in each column header. In column (6) and (7), I add weight at birth as control variables flexibly using a continuous variable and a
series of dummies for birth weight (<1500 g, 1500-2500 g, 2500-3500 g, and over 3500 g). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by district. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In column (6) and (7), I add weight at birth as control variables flexibly using
a continuous variable and a series of dummies for birth weight (<1500 g, 1500-
2500 g, 2500-3500 g, and over 3500 g). After birth, the policy reduces both infant
mortality and early neonatal mortality, conditional on birth weight. Overall, the
program has a much larger impact on mortality than on birth weight. The effects
on infant mortality are mostly driven by the effect on neonatal mortality. This
suggests that biological mechanism is a potential causal pathway linking fetals
and the kerosene-related pollutant exposures.
2.4.3.2 Indirect effects
The program might affect infant’s health through other channels other than
through the pollutant exposure. Antenatal visits, mother’s age at birth, birth
order and total number of births are high likely to also influence infant mortality
rarte. In this section, I test if the program affect these variables: the frequency
of antenatal visits, mothers’ age at birth, the first born, and the total number of
births in the last five years.
Table 2.7 reports two regression coefficients from Eq. 2.3. Column 1 shows
the coefficient of the program placement and Column 2 reports the coefficient
of treated districts. Column (1) shows that mothers were paying less visits for
antenatal care during pregnancy after the program. It might be that mothers no
longer have many pregnancy-related problems as before the program which then
lead to lower likelihood to seek antenatal care. In fact, Table 2.7 row (1) shows
there is no differential changes in antenatal visits.
Table 2.7, row (2) shows that the program does not lead to a changes in
mother’s age at birth. Young mothers (age less than 19) have a higher risk in
pregnancy compared to mothers older than 19 years old. If the program affects
fertility and leads to changes in the the likelihood for young mothers to get
pregnant, then the program effect on infant mortality might be driven by the
changes in pregnancy risk in the sample composition. One other possibility of
compositional issue is that if the program affects the probability of new mothers
having their firstborn. Row (3) shows that the program does not lead to a changes
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in composition of young mothers. Row (4) shows that the program does not lead
to changes in the probability of new mothers having their firstborn.
One possible source of bias is that if there is any differential trend fertility in
the targeted districts. I test if the program lead to changes in number of children
born in the last five years preceding the survey. Row (5) shows that the program
does not effect the number of children born in the last five years. Furthermore,
I aggregate number of child births at the district level then regress it with the
district fixed effects, the program placement, survey year, and the interaction
between program status and survey year22. If the coefficient on the interaction
term between the program status and survey year 2012 is significant then it would
indicate that the trends on number of birth in treated districts have a differential
trend and the decrease in infant mortality can be driven by the changes in the
number of births in the last five years preceding the survey. Total births is served
as a proxy for fertility. The results confirm that the decrease in infant mortality
is unlikely to be due to the differential change in fertility.
Table 2.7: The effect on other birth characteristics
Dependent variables
Treated district Treated district Mean of dep. Observations R-squared
X Program (θ1) (β1) variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Antenatal visitsa -0.08 (0.25) -0.58* (0.32) 6.60 31,702 0.15
Age at birth -0.07 (0.21) 0.54 (0.47) 27.56 39,348 0.03
Mother’s age <19 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.05 39,348 0.02
First birth 0.02 (0.01) -0.07** (0.03) 0.34 39,348 0.02
Child born in the last 5 years -0.02 (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 1.35 39,348 0.08
Notes: This table reports two regression coefficients from Eq. 2.3. Column 1 reports the coefficient of the program placement
and Column 2 reports the coefficient of treated districts. All regressions include district and survey year fixed effects which were
not shown to save space. aSample for antenatal visits is slightly less as it is only recorded for the latest birth. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
Another possibility is that the program changes the time allocation. I sepa-
rately regress the indicator variables for employment and leisure time. Employ-
ment variable is measured in three dummy variables: employed all year, employed
seasonal, employed occasional. Watching TV is used as a proxy for leisure time
22The result is available upon request
31
and is measured in three dummy variables: do not watch TV at all, watch TV
but has no TV. Although the results are not shown23, I find no effect of the
program on employment and leisure time which suggest that switching to LPG
might not have a significant effect on time allocation. This might be true in the
context of developing countries based on anecdotal evidence that cooking task
is assigned to mostly housewives who have low opportunity cost of lost time.
Overall results seem to indicate that there is no significant indirect effects from
these other outcomes, thus the effect of the program on infant mortality is could
be mainly driven by the direct effect on the pollutants exposure.
2.4.4 Heterogeneous in the program effect
In this section, I test if the program has heterogeneous effects based on subsam-
ples based on 5 categories: the duration, gender, rural/urban status, mother’s
education, and home ventilation. Table 2.8 shows the coefficient of the treatment
effect from a regression with the base model including all the controls and the
interaction with dummy program. The results are discussed below.
(1) Effect by duration. The effect of the program might be experienced soon
after the reduction in the pollutant exposure and/or after long repeated periods of
exposure. To see if such effect exists, I separately estimate the effect on household
in early targeted districts (after 2008) and later targeted districts (after 2009).
The result indicates that the effects are larger on households who got the program
earlier. A possible explanation is that this effect includes both immediate effect
on births and accumulated effect on the following births.
(2) Effects by gender. The results indicates a larger and significant effect on
female infants. There are at least two possible explanation. First, in developing
countries, gender discrimination often exist. If parents more likely to protect
boys from pollution, more likely to provide medical treatments, then the program
effect should be higher for girls. Parents maybe more concerned for boys’ health
compared to girls and thus unlikely to carry their infant while cooking. Thus
23Results are available upon request
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improvement in the air quality does not affect boys because they are not as
exposed as girls to the indoor air pollution. Second, there are large literature
regarding boys being biologically weaker and more susceptible to environmental
risks. Female fetuses have a higher threshold at which pollution leads to mortality
than boys do. If the air quality improvement is somewhat still higher than
pollution threshold for infant male, then the results should not reflect any changes
in infant male mortality.
(3) Rural/urban status. The results show stronger effects on rural area. It
supports the hypothesis that low-socioeconomic households are benefited more by
the pollution reduction given that there are more poorer households in rural area.
A possible explanation is that the effect on infant mortality rate in urban areas
might be offset by the outdoor air pollution which are growing due to economic
expansion after the financial crisis 2007-2008. There are also more health care
access in urban areas.
(4) Mother’s education. The results suggest that infants from low educated
mothers are benefited more from the program. It could be that mothers with low
education already have a low health endowment which initially made them more
prone to the air pollution. Alternatively, mothers with higher education tend to
know how to protect their children from the pollution by not carrying them while
cooking or by having more access to health facilities to treat their children.
(5) Home’s ventilation. Dasgupta et al. (2004) find that location of kitchen
has large and statistically significant effects on 24-hour average indoor pollutants
concentration, while Pitt et al. (2006) which find that an increase in the perme-
ability of roofs or walls has no significant effect on health. I test this by using a
question in the 2007 and 2012 survey: ”where food is cooked? in the house/in
separate building/outdoors”. I construct a dummy of whether food is cooked in
the house. Note that this question is not available in the 2002 survey, and there
are many more households that cook inside compared to outside. Consistent
with Dasgupta et al. (2004), the results show that the reduction in the infant
mortality is significant for households who cook inside the house. The program
has no effect on infant mortality on household who cook outside, as the health
risk of burning dirty fuel is less when there are a lot of air circulation. Moreover,
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households who cook outside are usually households who use wood fuel and not
being targeted in the program.
Table 2.8: Heterogeneous effects on infant mortality within subgroups
Subsamples Treatment Constant Observations R-squared
(1) Program time Start in 2009 -0.012** (0.005) -0.006 (0.047) 25,654 0.059
Start after 2009 -0.010* (0.005) 0.196 (0.220) 29,935 0.053
(2) Gender Male -0.005 (0.006) 0.002 (0.064) 20,346 0.065
Female -0.019*** (0.006) 0.428 (0.332) 18,542 0.059
(3) Location Rural -0.015*** (0.006) 0.196 (0.217) 25,886 0.058
Urban -0.008 (0.006) -0.376 (0.276) 13,002 0.068
(4) Mother’s education Higher than secondary -0.003 (0.005) -0.060 (0.052) 21,558 0.050
Low education -0.027*** (0.008) 0.220 (0.217) 17,330 0.071
(5) Ventilation Cook inside -0.011** (0.005) -0.074** (0.035) 23,018 0.063
Cook outside -0.008 (0.014) 0.015 (0.122) 4,323 0.124
Notes: Samples are split based on five categories in the first column. All regressions include all control variables and the interaction with
post program dummy. The outcome variable is infant mortality. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by district. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
2.4.5 Further Robustness Checks
The findings above demonstrate the consistency of the magnitude and the sig-
nificance of the program effect across different set of controls. In Table 2.9, I
extensively explore the result sensitivity to the sample selection, different unob-
served trend at regional and provincial level, matching estimator, clustering, and
placebo treatment.
Inclusion of excluded districts. I check robustness to the inclusion of the
excluded districts, using three different strategies: household fixed effects strategy
is used in column (1), Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) (Blackwell et al., 2009)
is used in column (2) and propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983) is used in column (3). Column (1) uses only survey wave 2012 which allows
me to track all the birth records within the same household24. The coefficient
shows within household effect of the program on infant mortality conditional
on month of birth and mother’s age at birth. It shows that the reduction in
24Note that the maternal and birth characteristics are only recorded for births occurred within 5
years preceding the survey, thus in this exercise I do not control for any maternal and birth char-
acteristics. I limit the last ten births (2002-2012) to maintain some degree of comparability.
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the infant mortality within household is mainly driven by the difference on the
program status not by the unobserved differences at household level. In column
(2), I balance the treated and untreated districts by wealth index, first birth,
young mother, electrification, recall period, birth order, age at birth, singleton
or multiple births, non-smoking behavior among household in the same province.
The sample includes all districts (including previously excluded districts) and all
three years of survey. Using the calculated CEM weights and year of birth fixed
effects do not change the results. Propensity score matching methods in column
(3) shows similar result. These results indicate that the program effect on the
infant mortality are not driven by the excluded districts.
Unobserved policy changes. There might concurrent local policy changes
on regional and provincial level. One region is lead by a governor and rule
up to 22 districts while one province consists up to 4 regions and each is a
separate island. Column (4) uses regional dummies interacted with year of birth
as additional control variables (there are 22 regions). Column (5) has province
dummies interacted with year of birth as additional control variables (there are
seven provinces). The results confirm that the effect is not driven by yearly trend
of the local policy changes at regional or provincial level.
Standard errors clustering. Column (6) replaces district clustering error term
to region clustering error term to allow serial correlation within region (there are
33 regions). The result is very similar either clustering at districts or at regions.
First year after the program. As discussed in Section 2.3, I exclude the first
year of the program implementation since there is limited information on which
month the targeted districts got the program. The result in column (7) shows
that the effect is insensitive to this first year exclusion. Similar with the results
in column (1) - (3), this shows that the program effect on infant mortality is
robust in every slice of the sample.
Aggregated to district level. I aggregated the infant mortality rate into district
level data by year of birth. Column (8) shows the effect of the program on
aggregated infant mortality rate on district level. Although the sample size is
reduced significantly, the treatment effect is still significant with a slightly lower
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than with child level analysis.
Placebo test. I use a placebo treatment on the pre program sample data.
The result in column (8) shows that infant mortality rate prior to the program
is similar between targeted and untargeted regions.
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Table 2.9: Additional robustness checks on infant mortality
2012 panel Coarsen
exact
matching
Propensity
score
matching
Regional
trend
Provincial
trend
Clustering 1st year
excluded
Panel
district
Pre
program
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment -0.011* -0.011** -0.012*** -0.011* -0.010** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.009*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Placebo treatment -0.001
(0.005)
Household FE Yes No No No No No No No No
District FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-year FE No No No Yes No No No No No
Province-year FE No No No No Yes No No No No
ControlsXPost No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Cluster 264 264 264 264 264 33 264 264 264
Observations 39,947 32,398 49,201 38,888 38,888 38,888 38,550 4,255 25,551
Sample 2012 only CEM
matched
Common
support
All All All Excluded
first year
District
aggregated
2002, 2007
Notes: Column (1) uses survey wave 2012 and household fixed effects. Column (2) uses Coarsened Exact Matching and the regression is based on the common support
weighted by CEM weights. Column (3) uses propensity score matching and the regression is based on the common support. Column (4) adds the interaction between
region dummies and year of birth. Column (5) adds the interaction between province dummies and year of birth. Column (6) uses clustering standard errors at regional
level. Column (7) exclude the first year of treatment. Column (8) uses aggregated infant mortality by district, controlling for dummy survey year. Column (9) uses
placebo treatment as if the program was started 5 years before the actual program. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by district. *** Significant at the 1
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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2.5 Policy Implication
This study suggests that access to cleaner fuel for cooking can lead to an im-
provement in health. In terms of the monetary benefit, replacing kerosene with
LPG in over three years led to approximately USD 2.9 billion net saving from
the removal of kerosene subsidy (Budya and Arofat, 2011). Even ignoring the
health benefit, the program still gives a positive net benefit, although there is
little known on the negative effect of the program that could offset its positive
benefit. By 2011, the program is estimated to reduce 717 infant deaths annually
based on 19.95 birth rate per 1,000 population on 91 million total population
in the targeted regions. Using a lower bound value of statistical life of USD 4
million (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), the benefits from these avoided deaths yield an
estimated USD 2,8 billion in annual savings. If the program is expanded to the
remaining untargeted regions after 2011, the program could lower infant death by
almost 299 lives annually (calculated based on 37 million total population in the
untargeted regions). It yields to an estimate of USD 2 billion annual savings. The
health benefit of the program covered in this study is limited to infant mortality,
but there is still possibility of other health benefits such as respiratory illnesses
and adult morbidity (Smith et al., 2013). Moreover, potential benefit outside of
health might also worth looking at, such as labor force and the environmental
impact. Budya and Arofat (2011) has section that discuss about new investment
in LPG leading to 28 thousand new jobs and an approximate reduction in CO2
emissions by 8.4 million tonnes per year due to this program.
About half million of the premature deaths attributed to air pollution stem
from pollution contributed by indoor air pollution, which made it one of the
largest public health issue in developing countries(Smith et al., 2013). Even
moving away from kerosene, a cleaner fuel compared to solid fuel, can lead to
a tangible health benefit. Thus, moving away from solid fuel is expected to
have even greater health benefits. This study should at least provide the lower
bound estimates on the health benefit on converting to cleaner cooking fuel. In
Indonesia, households who use solid fuel accounts for a major portion of the
population (at least 50% of the country’s total population). Even though LPG
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is not the cleanest fuel among others such as natural gas, electricity or renewable
energy, it is the cleanest among other dirty fuels such as solid fuels. It is also the
most affordable clean household energy in many developing countries.
There are many kinds of interventions in household energy. This program
provide an example of how pricing and quantity strategy might work to encourage
fuel switching. Without a government intervention, households often do not have
the incentives to switch to cleaner fuel(Mobarak et al., 2012). This program is
unique compared to many other LPG programs in other countries as the switching
to LPG is rather enforced in nature. The subsidized kerosene was removed once
the program rolled out in the targeted districts. Another example is India who
has succeeded in implementing their ’Give it Up’ program, a unique initiatives
that encourages altruistic motives from middle to high income households to
voluntarily give up their LPG subsidy to poorer households(Singh et al., 2017).
The optimal policy for household energy conversion which can better target the
poor is still an open question but it is an important aspect in reducing energy
poverty. Adding to Kojima (2011) who gives an optimistic review on the role of
LPG in reducing energy poverty, this study also provides some health evidence
of switching from kerosene to LPG.
2.6 Conclusion
In mostly developing countries, over 90 million people use kerosene for cooking.
It has been highly subsidized with USD 18 billion total subsidy per year (Mills,
2017). Given the high level of subsidy and potential adverse health risks of
kerosene, policy makers start to consider supporting other cleaner fuel such as
LPG. The complete analysis of a policy requires the full information on cost-
benefit, including health benefits. Reliable estimates on the effect of household
fuel conversion to the health outcomes is one of the primary elements missing in
the conventional cost-benefit analysis. There are lessons to learn from Indonesia’s
mega project on household fuel conversion. This paper documents its benefit on
early life health outcomes, the possible mechanism and its effects across groups.
This study provides a lower bounds on the benefit of cleaner energy access
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to infant mortality rate because it is based on the live births population. For
example, mothers who suffer from fetal losses might decide to not become preg-
nant. Hence, the children in the sample are born from mothers who are generally
healthier than those who decided to not become pregnant. This study also does
not intend to show a dose-response relationship between indoor air pollution and
health, but focuses on the average treatment effect from having access to a clean-
er cooking fuel. Nonetheless, it provides the first estimation on the health benefit
from switching from kerosene to LPG which is shown to have significantly greater
health benefit to the most vulnerable group, the poor households with low edu-
cation. Overall, such program intervention on subsidizing cleaner cooking fuel is
one way to achieve the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.
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Chapter 3
Variable Pricing and the Cost of
Renewable Energy
1
3.1 Introduction
How much will it cost to eliminate use of fossil fuels? There is reason for optimism.
Technological progress has lowered the cost of wind and solar power to make
them increasingly competitive with coal and natural gas on a levelized basis.
Battery storage costs are also falling, which should grow electric vehicle use and
could help electric grids absorb intermittent renewable energy when it happens
to be plentiful. Increasing integration of markets across regions and countries
could further facilitate adoption of wind and solar, as they allow more flexible
trading of power from times and locations with relatively high supply to those
with relatively little. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that intermittency
combined with the high cost of storage greatly increases the cost of renewable
energy from a system perspective Gowrisankaran et al. (2016).
A key challenge is that modern infrastructure has been built around electrici-
1joint work with Michael J. Roberts and Matthias Fripp
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ty systems with centralized and easily controllable generation. Electric grids oper-
ate through balancing authorities that adjust electricity generation on timescales
ranging from seconds to years, to perfectly balance presumably inelastic, time-
varying demand (Figure 3.1, panel A). Although marginal generation costs vary
over time in a conventional system, regulated retail prices tend to be flat, giving
rise to well-known inefficiencies. But since incremental costs only spike during
rare peak loads, the inefficiencies from flat rates are thought to be small, with
most concern centered on market power as demand approaches capacity con-
straints Borenstein and Holland (2005); Borenstein (2005); Blonz (2016). Utili-
ties and generating companies have little incentive to change the current system,
possibly because too few are aware of the possibilities associated with variable
prices, or because it may not benefit them under cost-of-service regulatory struc-
tures that currently predominate at the distribution level. Customers have also
been unenthusiastic about dynamic marginal-cost pricing, possibly because they
lack confidence that they would individually benefit from it. The smoothing of
costs when setting retail rates makes demand highly inflexible (inelastic) with re-
spect to generation cost on a day-to-day, hour-to-hour basis, and current system
planning and operation reflect this inflexibility.
Balancing almost entirely on the supply side and foregoing potential demand
response creates some deadweight loss in existing power systems, but the loss
will be much greater in power systems with a large share of intermittent re-
newables. Solar and wind power are the most cost-effective renewables, but the
supply varies with sunlight and windspeed. When intermittent renewables make
up a small to moderate share of total generation, the existing infrastructure can
accommodate their variability in much the same way it has always managed
variable demand. Variations in renewable energy are counterbalanced with di-
rected variation in generation from fossil fuel plants. But as larger shares of
renewable energy are accommodated using this conventional model, system-level
costs may rise significantly above the levelized costs from any particular source.
Controllable generation must be built or retained to compensate for periods of
low renewable power production, and these plants may burn either polluting fos-
sil fuels or high-cost biofuels. Providing spinning reserves from thermal power
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plants — ramping them up and down to compensate for short-term variations
in demand or renewable production — requires running these plants at ineffi-
cient fractional load levels. Moreover, as more intermittent renewable power is
added to the grid, eventually supply begins to exceed demand and storage ca-
pacity at certain times, and renewable energy must be curtailed (i.e., discarded).
This creates diminishing returns for renewable power and raises average costs.
In Hawai’i, Texas, Ireland and perhaps other places, a considerable amount of
electricity is already curtailed, even while utility customers may simultaneously
pay 30 cents per kWh or more for electricity. With retail prices far above the in-
cremental cost of generation (zero or negative during curtailment), there appears
to be inefficiency in the current system, even with renewable energy penetration
far below the eventual goals in state renewable portfolio standards. Resolving
this inefficiency would help to slow climate change.
To economists, the obvious solution to intermittency is real-time retail pricing
that reflects the incremental cost and marginal willingness to pay for electricity.
If electricity were priced at its incremental value and cost there would be new,
powerful incentives to efficiently store energy on a distributed basis or otherwise
shift consumption from times and places of relatively scarce renewable supply to
times and places of plenty. Chemical storage of electricity in batteries or hydrogen
remains expensive. However, critically, and potentially transformationally, elec-
tricity consumers already have access to many low-cost systems that store energy
in different forms. By carefully timing water heating, electric vehicle charging and
water pumping, using ice storage for cooling systems, making micro-adjustments
for some kinds of refrigeration, or perhaps other means, electricity use can be
shifted from seconds to many hours at low cost. Such mechanisms would need
to be automated by smart devices acting on customers’ behalf. These existing
technologies can make electricity demand highly substitutable over time, at least
over horizons up to a day or so. In addition to shifting the timing of electricity
consumption within the day, customers facing dynamic prices can also adjust the
total amount of power they consume each day, reducing total consumption during
extended periods when power is scarce, or increasing it when power is abundant.
We conceptualize this substitutability and overall elasticity with a more elastic
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Figure 3.1: Conventional Utility and Utility of the Future
Notes: Intermittent renewables change the nature of the utility. The horizontal axis is power generated or consumed
at a point in time, and the vertical axis is incremental willingness to pay (Demand) or incremental cost of generation
(Supply). A stylized frequency distribution of load is shown at the bottom. Panel A shows a conventional utility
with flexible supply that can ramp generation up and down with varying demand without greatly changing the
incremental cost of power, except for rare peaking loads, so prices are typically low (Pl). Welfare gains have been
gleaned from curbing peak loads with critical-peak pricing and demand charges for commercial users, which tie each
firm’s incremental price to its historical peak. Panel B shows a hypothetical utility of the future, with generation
coming mainly from inflexible, time-varying intermittent renewables and real-time pricing. With highly volatile
time-varying prices, storage and shiftable loads cause demand to become more flexible, especially in the lower price
range, but prices can spike very high during unusual periods when supply is low and demand high.
demand in panel B of figure 3.1. While demand-side flexibilities would make in-
termittent renewable energy more cost effective from a system perspective, they
will only be brought to market and adopted if pricing mechanisms incentivize
them.
In this paper we develop a novel model of power supply and demand to ex-
amine the extent to which variable pricing could plausibly increase the social
benefits of renewable energy. The model is novel in the way it integrates invest-
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ment in generation and storage capacity with real-time operation of the system,
including an account of reserves, a demand system with different interhour e-
lasticities for different end uses, as well as substitution between electric power
and other goods and services. Both supply and demand sides of the model can
also provide reserves. The model, an extension of Switch Fripp (2012); Johnston
et al. (2017), is open source and adaptable to other settings. Earlier versions of
the model (lacking reserves and demand-side integration) have been implemented
for California, the Western United States, and other areas Fripp (2012); Nelson
et al. (2012); Mileva et al. (2013); Wei et al. (2013); Ponce de Leon Barido et al.
(2015); Sanchez et al. (2015); He et al. (2016).
Our study considers the island of Oahu, the most populous island (about 1
million) and county of Hawai’i, which comprises roughly two thirds of the state’s
population and consumes over three quarters of the state’s power. The island
supports a large urban city (Honolulu), plus a substantial tourist industry and
several large military bases. Hawai’i is a particularly interesting focus for several
reasons. First, its scale is large enough to be emblematic of larger, more com-
plex systems, but small enough to be holistically modeled. Second, given Oahu’s
isolation and lack of connectivity to other Hawaiian islands, intermittency is an
especially acute problem, since connectivity and trade with other regions is not
economically feasible. Third, Hawai’i has the nation’s, and perhaps the world’s,
most ambitious renewable portfolio standard – 100 percent renewable by 2045
– which makes our analysis especially relevant to actual policy implementation.
Fourth, Hawai’i depends on oil for its power production, making wind and solar
power cheaper than fossil fuels today, so it is first to face an economic crossover
that other regions will face in the future, as wind and solar move toward under-
cutting natural gas and coal.
We use the model to: (1) estimate the cost, benefits and optimal generation
mix of a 100 percent renewable energy system that accords with Hawai’i’s renew-
able portfolio standard (RPS) as compared to a conventional fossil-fuel power
system (Fossil) and a least-cost system with no constraints on the generation
mix (Unconstrained); (2) evaluate the welfare improvement of having dynamic
marginal-cost pricing as compared to flat price for each kind of system (RPS,
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Fossil, and Unconstrained); (3) evaluate how much those with high interhour
substitutability of demand gain from dynamic pricing as compared to those with
very little interhour substitutability.
Cost assumptions for a wide range of power generation and storage alterna-
tives, from which an optimal portfolio is selected by the model, are based on those
in the most recent (December, 2016) Power Supply Improvement Plan (PSIP)
of the local utility, Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO).2 We consider scenarios
for which costs equal current-day assumptions, as well as scenarios that use the
lower costs projected for renewable and battery technologies in 2045 in the PSIP.
The analysis we perform here is a single-stage analysis in the sense that each
scenario assumes the optimized system is built at one point in time, although
pre-existing assets can be retained. We do this to make clear comparisons of
highly-renewable and fossil systems in flat and dynamic pricing contexts, and to
show how much renewable power would be selected in optimized systems with
fixed versus dynamic marginal-cost pricing. In practice, an optimal plan would
make investments gradually over time; Switch does have the capacity to formu-
late such a plan, even though we do not consider it in this paper. Such a model
would be considerably slower to solve.
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that dynamic pricing of power pro-
vides little social benefit in fossil-fuel systems, only 2.6 to 4.6 % of baseline annual
expenditure depending on cost and interhour substitutability. But dynamic pric-
ing leads to a much greater social benefit of 8.5 to 23.4% in a 100% renewable
system with otherwise similar assumptions. The other key finding is that high
penetration renewable systems, including 100% renewable, are remarkably afford-
able. Indeed, the welfare maximizing (unconstrained) generation portfolio under
the utility’s projected 2045 costs and pessimistic interhour demand flexibility us-
es 79% renewable energy and improves welfare by 34.6% of baseline expenditure.
With dynamic pricing, even a 100% renewable system is welfare improving over a
fossil system, excluding gains from reduced pollution externalities. These results
all derive from an assumed outer demand elasticity of just 0.1, and cost assump-
2See https://www.hawaiianelectric.com/about-us/our-vision.
46
tions for renewable energy and batteries that some may regard as pessimistic.
In other scenarios the benefits of real time pricing paired with renewable energy
can be far greater.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 characterizes the
demand system and how we calibrate it; Section 3.3 reviews the Switch model
that optimizes investment and operations, as well as a Dantzig-Wolf algorithm
used to equilibrate supply and demand and thereby optimize the joint system;
Section 3.4 summarizes capital and input cost assumptions and the wide range
of scenarios we consider; Section 3.5 summarizes the results; and Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Demand
The main novelty of this paper is the integration of a fully-specified interhour
demand system with Switch, a state-of-the-art planning model that jointly op-
timizes investment and chronological, hourly operation of a power system. We
therefore begin by describing the structure of the demand system and how we
calibrate it.
3.2.1 A Nested-CES Demand System
The demand system is comprised as the sum of three nested, constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) utility functions that represent different types of demand.
The outer layer of each utility function assumes just two goods, electricity and all
other goods, with a constant elasticity of substitution θ, which represents a de-
mand elasticity. The nested layer considers electricity demand in each hour within
each 24-hour day, with an interhourly elasticity of substitution σ. Aggregate de-
mand in any given day is comprised as the weighted sum of three representative
pseudo-customers with different σ values. Each pseudo-customer is assumed to
maximize utility U(x1, x2, . . . , xh, . . . , x24, Y |σ, θ, α, β1, β2, . . . , xh, . . . , β24) subjec-
t to their budget constraint,
∑24
h=1 phxh+Y = M , where xh is electricity consumed
in hour h, Y represents expenditure on all other goods with a constant price e-
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qual to 1 (i.e., money), α and βh are share parameters that weight all other goods
relative to electricity, and electricity in each hour relative to other other hours,
and M is total income. M is calibrated by dividing total baseline electricity
expenditure of a particular pseudo-customer in a day by the share of aggregate
income spent on electricity. The α and βh parameters are calibrated from the
statewide share of income spent on electricity expenditure, and by baseline load
shares allocated to each pseudo-customer.
Following Rutherford (2008), suppose there exists a unit expenditure function
or an ideal price index (the minimum expenditure required to achieve baseline
utility) in the “calibrated share form,” a measure relative to baseline values. The
expenditure function is:
e(ph, p(−h), p¯h, ¯p(−h), U¯) = U¯
α(pY
p¯Y
)1−θ
+ (1− α)
(
n∑
h=1
βh
(
ph
p¯h
)1−σ) 1−θ1−σ
1
1−θ
(3.1)
where U¯ , p¯Y , p¯h indicate baseline values for respective parameters, α is the
calibrated share given the baseline value of Y¯ = M−∑h x¯hp¯h, α = Y¯ /M , and βh
are calibrated shares of each day’s electricity consumed by the pseudo-customer
in each hour at the associated baseline prices p¯h.
Consumer welfare is measured by the indirect money metric utility function.
That is, we can write indirect utility in terms of the income required at baseline
prices to achieve the utility level achievable at prices p and income M , as:
V (ph, p¯−h,M) =
M
e(ph, p(−h), p¯h, p¯−h, U¯)
(3.2)
From Roy’s Identity, Marshallian demand is given by:
xh(e(ph, p−h, p¯h, p¯−h),M) = − ∂V/∂ph
∂V/∂M
=
M
e
∂e
∂ph
The closed form solution of demand functions then can be written as a func-
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tion of calibrated share parameters derived from a baseline load profile and the
share of income spent on electricity at baseline prices.
xh(p|p¯, σ, β,M)
p¯
=
M
α + (1− α)( 24∑
j=1
βj
(
pj
p¯j
)1−σ) 1−θ1−σ−1×(1−α)( 24∑
j=1
βj
(
pj
p¯j
)1−σ)σ−θ1−σ
×βh
(
p¯h
ph
)σ
(3.3)
In the computational model, we partition a baseline load profile, drawn from
actual historical hourly demand, into three pseudo-customers, each with a dif-
ferent interhour substitutability parameter, σ ∈ {σl = 0.1, σm = 1, σf = 10}
and a different baseline demand profile, derived from historic loads. Pseudo cus-
tomers thus differ with regard to their budget and with regard to their calibrated
share parameters (βh), because their load profiles differ. The calibrated share
parameters also differ by day and season, to account for weather.
To formalize this demand system, denote the calibrated load shares on day d
and pseudo-customer i by βid and income by M id = E
id
s
, where Eid is the baseline
expenditure of pseudo-customer i on day d, and s is the share of baseline state
income spent on electricity. Thus, define the demand for a pseudo-customer i
on day d in hour h as xh(p|p¯, σi, βid,M id), using the definition in equation 3.3.
Aggregate demand on day d and hour h is given by the sum of the demands from
the three pseudo-customers:
xdh(p|p¯) = xh(p|p¯, σl, βld,M ld) + xh(p|p¯, σm, βmd,Mmd) + xh(p|p¯, σf , βfd,M fd)
(3.4)
This demand system provides an intuitive and relatively simple way to em-
body a range of heterogenous demand responses and inter-temporal substitutabil-
ity of loads that vary over seasons and weather-related circumstances. The degree
of interhour substitutability may under- or over-estimate actual technical possi-
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bilities. For example, it assumes the same degree of substitutability between any
two hours within the same day. At least for some kinds of demand, substitutabil-
ity may be greater for hours nearer in time. At the same time, the demand
system assumes zero substitutability between days, when in reality substitution
between late in one day and early in the next may be fairly elastic. While this
later assumption may under-estimate the overall degree of flexibility, the struc-
ture makes it easy to scale up a sample of representative days throughout the
year to parsimoniously represent a portfolio of days with weather and demand
that are chronologically matched with supply.
3.2.2 Shares of Flexible Demand
This section describes how we estimate baseline loads for each kind of pseudo-
customer. We used hourly aggregate demand data for Oahu from the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to calibrate hourly load shares that are coinci-
dent with solar and wind data used in modeling the supply side. This allows
the model to account for the covariances between renewable supply and demand.
However, because some kinds of demand are likely to be more time shiftable
than others, we develop alternative interhour flexibility scenarios based on esti-
mated load shares that are known to be shiftable using current technologies: air
conditioning, water pumping and water heating.
Air conditioning demand is shiftable using ice storage, wherein ice is gener-
ated when electricity prices are low, and used for cooling instead of running the
compressor when electricity prices are high. These systems can be retrofitted
onto existing air-conditioning systems. A number of companies already market
this technology to reduce demand charges3, to respond to real-time variation in
prices, or provide contingency or regulating reserves to the balancing authority.4
3Demand charges, which are common for commercial electricity customers, link monthly bills to the
highest kW draw, typically averaged over a 15-minute period, from each commercial customer
during the month or year. However, because peak demand by an individual customer is unlikely
to coincide with the system peak, demand charges may do little to improve efficiency relative to
real-time pricing Borenstein et al. (2002).
4Regulating reserves balance the electricity system in real time as demand fluctuates from moment
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Such systems may only require different, smarter controllers and network connec-
tivity. A considerable amount of flexible power is also used to pump water from
aquifers to storage reservoirs and tanks on hillsides; water is then gravity fed to
homes and businesses. Currently, most water pumping is done at night, because
the water municipality receives a slight discount under current time-of-use pric-
ing. There should be a considerable amount of flexibility in when pumping could
occur, a flexibility that is mainly constrained by the capacity of water storage. A
number of companies have also developed smart water heaters, which can heat
proactively in relation to power availability (or prices) and typical use patterns
instead of reactively to hot water use. All of these systems embody an implicit
form of storage that may be much less expensive than batteries, compressed air,
pumped-water hydroelectricity or other means. These systems can also provide
a source of reserves to help maintain system stability in the face of unexpected
load fluctuations.
By considering loads from only these three principle sources, we believe our
estimates of demand-response potential should be conservative, because other
kinds of electricity demand for which we could not obtain estimates, or for which
current technologies do not exist, may nevertheless prove shiftable if appropriate
incentives and technologies were to be made available. For example, refriger-
ator/freezers and swimming pool pumps likely have large, time-shiftable loads,
but we do not explicitly consider them in this study because we were unable to
obtain data on their real-time use.
Another consideration is that over 70 percent of total demand on Oahu de-
rives from commercial customers, many of whom have electricity metered at 15
minute intervals or less to accommodate demand charges specified in commercial
tariffs. The state is also developing plans to install smart meters for other cus-
tomers. Even without smart meters, we expect that integrators could implement
a wide range of demand-response services, including reserve provision, by us-
ing other forms of network connectivity to control power consumption of certain
to moment while contingency reserves keep the system stable in response to larger disruptions,
such as a power plant unexpectedly falling off line.
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designated devices. Alternatively, devices could be programmed to forecast and
respond to price signals automatically.
Estimates of shiftable load in each hour of each month are drawn from Nav-
igant Consulting (2015), a private consulting report commissioned by Hawaiian
Electric, a copy of which was submitted to the Public Utility Commission. Al-
though much of the report is redacted, obscuring the methods used to estimate
load shares from alternative uses, it is the only available load share data, specific
to Oahu, that we have been able to obtain. The starting point for our estimates
is a graph in the report depicting September 2025 projected end-use loads by
hour of the day. We measured the bars in the graphs by hand to estimate load
shares in each hour for this month, and summed those for air conditioning, water
heating and water pumping to obtain an estimate for the mid-September share
of potentially shiftable load. Because loads vary over time, and tend to be higher
when it is warmer, presumably due to greater use of air conditioning, we ad-
justed load shares for other months to account for this seasonality. We made
this adjustment using hourly load estimates provided in the Navigant report for
February, May, August and November of 2014, but were not partitioned by end
use. These hourly loads were regressed against a polynomial of hour-of-day and
average temperature in each month.
Load = β0 + β1h+ β2h
2 + β3h
3 + β4PV + β5T.
where h is hour per day, PV is distributed generation from photovoltaic solar
(which may be associated with temperature), and T is temperature. We attribute
temperature-sensitive load to air conditioning, and then using load shares given
for September 2025 as a baseline, we infer the air conditioning share for the other
months, linearly interpolating between February, May, August and Noveember.
Load shares attributable to water pumping and water heating is assumed to be
same across all months of the year.
We consider three different scenarios (optimistic, moderate, pessimistic), each
of which assigns different shares of the potentially-flexible and other load to
pseudo-customers with different interhour substitutability. The assumptions for
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each scenario are reported in table 3.1. In figures 3.2 and 3.3 we plot the implied
shares of highly flexible, moderately flexible, and inflexible demand in total and
by hour and month for each of the three scenarios.
In the end, we cannot know in advance how much demand is truly flexible or
the appropriate elasticities to use, nor anticipate how much potentially flexible
customers will choose to engage with a well-designed variable-pricing program.
We anticipate that commercial customers would comprise the bulk of participat-
ing flexible demand. Because commercial customers comprise over 70% of Oahu’s
load and commercial loads have a large share of potentially-shiftable load, the
optimistic scenarios assume that a large majority, but not all, of commercial
customers with shiftable load would actively participate in a demand response
program. That optimistic scenario might be justified by the historically high par-
ticipation of commercial customers in real-time marginal-cost pricing programs
like the one in Georgia. We anticipate that participation could be even greater in
future Hawai’i, since price variation will presumably be far greater and advanced
computing technologies could make participation convenient and relatively low
cost.
Table 3.1: Share of shiftable load
σ Optimistic Moderate Pessimistic
Share of potentially flexible load
(water pumping, water heading and air conditioning)
Highly Flexible 10 67% 33% 15%
Somewhat Flexible 1 5% 5% 5%
Highly Inflexible 0.1 28% 62% 80%
Other load
Highly Flexible 10 15% 8% 0%
Somewhat Flexible 1 5% 5% 5%
Highly Inflexible 0.1 80% 88% 95%
Notes: Shares of flexible and inflexible shares in each scenario.
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Figure 3.2: Demand flexibility scenarios
3.2.3 Demand-Side Reserves
Up reserves normally refer to residual capacity by dispatchable generators that
can ramp up in the event that a power plant drops oﬄine, wind or solar energy
generation unexpectedly falls, or demand suddenly spikes. Reserves can also be
provided by the demand side, and this is typically what power engineers call
demand response, while economists normally connect the term to the more gen-
eral idea of price-sensitive demand. Historically, demand-side up reserves have
involved contracts between the balancing authority (e.g., utility or ISO) and
large-scale users of electricity that give the balancing authority the ability and
right, in exchange for a rate reduction, to remotely reduce or terminate power
supply to participating customers during certain critical events (note that “up”
reserves are specified from a generation perspective, so they correspond to reduc-
ing load). In Hawai’i, residential customers have also participated in a program
that gives residential customers a $3 monthly discount in exchange for allow-
ing the utility to suspend power supply to water heaters during critical events.
Similarly, down reserves correspond to the option of quickly ramping down a
power plant or increasing energy use in the event of a net supply surge, which
might result from a sudden falloff of demand or supply surge from intermittent
renewables.
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Figure 3.3: Demand flexibility scenarios by hour and month
The graphs show three scenarios for interhour demand flexibility, optimistic, moderate, pes-
simistic, respectively. Note that all demand types are assumed to have the same overall demand
elasticity for electricity (0.1 in the the baseline case). Flexible, midflex and inflexible loads
are assumed to have within-day interhour elasticities of substitution equal to 10, 1 and 0.1
respectively.
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The model presented here includes demand-side participation in reserve mar-
kets for both up and down reserves, with only highly-flexible demand types as-
sumed to participate. Reserves can also be supplied by the supply side, either
from batteries or dispatchable generators. On the demand side, we incorporate
reserve provision into flexible-type demand by applying a net cost that includes
sale of up and down reserves and purchase of energy, all at real-time prices. We
define these as follows:
xuh = x
∗
h (3.5)
xdh = max(xh)− x∗h (3.6)
where x∗h is energy use in hour h, x
u
h is demand-side up-reserves provision (option
to decrease demand) in hour h, xdh is demand-side down-reserves provision (option
to increase demand) in hour h, max(xh) is the maximum electricity demand when
price equals an imposed minimum ($1 per MWh). The minimum price limits
demand that could otherwise rise to infinite levels given the constant-elasticity
structure of the demand system. The flexible pseudo-customer chooses x∗h (and
implicitly xuh and x
d
h), resulting in a net cost given as follows:
Net Cost = p∗hx
∗
h + p
u
hx
u
h + p
d
hx
d
h (3.7)
= p∗hx
∗
h + p
u
hx
∗
h + p
d
h · (max(xh)− x∗h) (3.8)
= x∗h · (p∗h + puh − pdh) + pdh max(xh), (3.9)
i.e., the incremental cost per unit of consumption is p∗h + p
u
h − pdh.
3.2.4 Calibration of Hourly Demand Shares
We calibrate demand scenarios by estimating the share of aggregate load in each
hour and each month used for three potentially shiftable loads: water heating,
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water pumping and air conditioning. Typically these uses of power can be shifted
many hours at relatively low cost using existing technologies. We then suppose
optimistic (67%), midline (33%) and pessimistic (15%) scenarios, each of which
assumes a different share of these potentially-shiftable loads will actually have
high interhour substitutability within a day (elasticity = 10). Across all scenar-
ios we assume just 5% of baseline demand has moderate substitutability between
hours (elasticity = 1). We assume that 80-95% of remaining load (not for water
heating, water pumping or air conditioning) is highly inelastic between hours
(elasticity = 0.1). The optimistic scenario could be achieved with widespread
adoption of real-time pricing and automated demand-response systems by com-
mercial users alone.
We use a baseline model that assumes an overall demand for energy (captur-
ing substitution between electricity and all other goods) that is highly inelastic
(elasticity = 0.1), which is consistent with a recent estimate with a strong study
design and relatively similar climate and marginal price profile Ito (2014). While
some studies find larger demand elasticities, they tend to be based on poorer
study designs and we believe it is important to have a baseline model that is
reasonably conservative. Within our model, this outer elasticity captures de-
mand response over longer time horizons, which helps with seasonal imbalance
and episodic weather, and adjusts overall scale modestly depending on average
prices. However, because it seems possible that new technologies and energy de-
mands might arise in a world with highly variable (and often free or nearly free)
electricity, we also consider scenarios with larger demand overall elasticities (0.5,
0.9 and 2.0).
3.2.5 Electric Vehicles
An important consideration for modeling future power systems with high-penetration
renewables is the potential growth of electric vehicles. Electric vehicles represent
a new source of power demand and, given their large and growing battery sizes,
a new source of power storage or interhour flexibility that might also provide
reserves. Like demand-side flexibility, it is highly uncertain how quickly electric
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vehicles may grow as a share of the vehicle fleet. Given the unique nature of pow-
er demand from electric vehicles, plus the fact that they comprise a small share of
historical loads used to calibrate the demand functions described above, we treat
them separately. We also consider scenarios with a wide range of electric vehicle
adoption, 0.5% (the current share), 50% and 100%. In variable pricing environ-
ments we assume that vehicle charging is optimally scheduled to least-cost times
in each day, and thus makes high-penetration renewable systems easier to achieve,
but do not allow for any interday substitution of charging (which will likely be
feasible). In fixed-price environments we assume vehicle charging occurs as soon
as vehicles arrive at home or work, based on trip inventories from the National
Household Travel Survey Fripp (2017); Das and Fripp (2015); FHA (2009). This
shifts up the evening peak more than other times, and makes high-penetration
renewable systems more costly.
3.3 Switch 2.0
Switch5 Fripp (2012); Johnston et al. (2017) is open-source power planning soft-
ware that uses mixed-integer linear programming to minimize the net present
value of the cost of electricity production subject to operation and policy con-
straints. The main decision variables are generation capacities at each candidate
project site and the amount of power to produce or store at each project site
during each hour of the planning period. Constraints require adequate power to
satisfy demand plus reserves during all hours, and satisfaction of any exogenous
policy constraints, such as a renewable portfolio standard (RPS).
Switch combines an operational model, similar in detail to production cost
models such as GE MAPS or Plexos, and a long-term capacity expansion mod-
el, similar to Ventyx Strategist or PowerSimm Planner. Commercial capacity
planning models typically consider the distribution of loads exogenously imposed
on a system, neglecting price response by customers. Moreover, conventional
planning or expansion models generally use unordered sets of time steps, and
5http://www.switch-model.org
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thus do no have enough temporal detail to model the operation of power sys-
tems with a large share of time-varying renewables. Such power sources may
need to be curtailed or be balanced by interhour load shifting or energy storage,
which can only be modeled accurately with chronological time steps. In contrast
to conventional capacity planning models, conventional production cost models
can optimize chronological management, but assume fixed generation portfolios
that must be selected by other means. Efficient integration of renewables can be
greatly enhanced by simultaneously considering both capacity and chronological
operation decisions, as does Switch Fripp (2012); Johnston et al. (2017); Nweke
et al. (2012); Sullivan et al. (2014).
3.3.1 Mathematical Formulation of Switch
Here we provide a brief overview of the core equations used by Switch. A more
complete documentation of the software can be found in Johnston et al. (2017).
Switch 2.0 has a modular architecture that reflects the modularity of actu-
al power systems. Most power system operators follow rules that maintain an
adequate supply of power, and most individual devices are not concerned with
the operation of other devices. Similarly, core modules in Switch define spatially
and temporally resolved balancing constraints for energy and reserves, and an
overall social cost. Separate modules represent components such as generators,
batteries or transmission links. These modules interact with the overall optimiza-
tion model by adding terms to the shared energy and reserve balances and the
overall cost expression. They can also define decision variables and constraints
to govern operation of each technology. This approach makes it possible for
users to add, remove or alter modules, representing different system components
and formulations without unexpected interactions with other parts of the model.
Consequently, Switch 2.0 can be readily customized to address the needs of a
given study or region.
In the treatment below, we have omitted elements that define regional load
zones and power transfers between these zones, since our model of Oahu has only
a single zone. However, transmission constraints would be of critical importance
59
for applications to larger geographical areas that are connected, such as the
continental United States. We have similarly omitted definitions for multiple
investment periods, since we use a single stage for this study.
3.3.1.1 Objective Function
The objective function minimizes the net present value of all investment and
operation costs:
min
∑
cf∈Cfixed
cf +
∑
t∈T
wyeart
∑
cv∈Cvar
cvt (3.10)
Function (3.10) sums over sets of fixed costs Cfixed and variable costs Cvar. Each
fixed cost component cf ∈ Cfixed is a model object, specified in units of dollars per
year. This object may be a variable, parameter or expression (calculation based
on other components). Variable cost components cv are indexed by timepoint (t)
among all study timepoints (T ) and specified in units of dollars per hour. The
term cvt is the element with index t from component c
v, i.e., a variable cost that
occurs during timepoint t. The weight factor wyeart scales costs from a sampled
timepoint to an annualized value. For this study, we select one 24 hour day
from each month of the year, so that the time points t specify actual hours.
The weights multiply the individual days by about 30 such that the accounting
reflects costs over an entire year.
Plug-in modules add components to the fixed and variable cost sets to repre-
sent each cost that they introduce. For example, the generator-building module
adds the total annual fixed cost for all generators and batteries (capital repay-
ment and fixed operation and maintenance) to the Cfixed set, and the generator-
dispatch module adds variable costs (fuel and variable O&M) for these facilities
to Cvar. The specification is generic so that models of different granularity may
be considered depending on the needs of a particular problem and computational
expense.
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3.3.1.2 Operational Constraints
Power Balance: Specifies that power injections and withdrawals must balance
during each time point. Injections are mainly output from power plants and
battery storage, and withdrawals are mainly customer loads and battery charging.
As with the objective function, plug-in modules add model objects to P inject and
Pwithdraw to show the amount of power injected or withdrawn by each system
component during each timepoint. For this study, production components were
defined by the standard generation modules, and withdrawal components were
defined by the standard electric vehicle model and a purpose-built responsive
demand module.
∑
pi∈P inject
pit =
∑
pw∈Pwithdraw
pwt , ∀t ∈ T (3.11)
Dispatch: Power generation from a source (e.g., a power plant) must fall below
its committed (turned on) capacity Wg,t during time point t multiplied by a
capacity factor ηg,t, that may vary with exogenous factors like solar radiation or
wind speed.
Pg,t ≤ ηg,tWg, ∀g ∈ G, ∀t ∈ T (3.12)
Additional constraints further limit operation:
Wg,t ≤ Kg, ∀g ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (3.13)
dming Wg,t ≤ Pg,t, ∀g ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (3.14)
Equation 3.13 constrains the commitment choice to fall below the installed ca-
pacity Kg (possibly multiple identical units); equation 3.14 limits dispatch by a
minimum-load constraint that applies to many power plants.
Minimum up and down times : The amount of capacity started up (Up,t) or shut
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down (Vp,t) during each hour in each generation project is calculated via
Wg,t −Wg,t−1 = Ug,t − Vg,t, ∀g ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (3.15)
Additional constraints require that all capacity that was started up during an
uptime look back window (τˆug , defined for each project technology) is still online,
and that all capacity that was shutdown during the downtime look back window
(τˆdg ) remains uncommitted.
Wg,t ≥
t∑
t′=t−τˆug
Ug,t′ , ∀g ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (3.16)
Wg,t ≤ KGg −
t∑
t′=t−τˆdg
Vg,t′ , ∀g ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (3.17)
The variable Ug,t is also used to determine startup costs for each plant (not
shown).
3.3.2 Oahu Configuration of Switch
Switch is configured based on Hawai’i’s 2007 power system data, together with
finely gridded, coincident, chronological wind and solar radiation data. Capital
cost and fuel cost assumptions are based on Hawaiian Electric Company’s recent
Power Supply and Improvement Plan (https://www.hawaiianelectric.com/
about-us/our-vision). Renewable resource potential is derived from screening
available land resources as described below.
3.3.2.1 Utility-Scale Solar
Land available for utility-scale solar was restricted to parcels zoned for agricul-
tural or country use, excluding Class A agricultural land per Hawai’i statute.
This is conservative because it excludes a significant amount military land, and
the military plans to install a considerable amount of solar. We also excluded
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land with a slope greater than 10%, land within 50 meters of street centerlines,
and parcels with any directional dimension less than 60 meters. We assume
fixed-panel photovoltaic installations use six acres per MW (AC) of capacity and
that tracking photovoltaic installations use 7.5 acres per MW (AC) of capacity.
These are roughly in the lower quartile of the national statistics indicated by
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)6. Fixed photovoltaic has a
ground cover ratio of 0.68 and tracking systems have a cover ratio of 0.45. These
assumptions affect the capacity factor when the sun is low. We then use NREL’s
PV Watts tool to calculate hourly output for each 4 km cell using irradiance
data from the National Solar Radiation Database (NSRDB). The map of lands
considered are shown in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Land Available for Utility-Scale Solar
The map shows land that is assumed to be available for utility scale solar installations on Oahu
given zoning and other technical and legal constraints (shown in yellow). Each area circled in
blue is entered as a separate generation project in Switch, with different projects having different
capacity limits and hourly production profiles. Red lines indicate roads.
6See http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56290.pdf.
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3.3.3 Rooftop Solar
Rooftop solar potential was estimated from roof area from Google Map images.
Visual review of many roofs indicates accurate identification. We assume 40
percent coverage of roofs, which is equivalent to 15 percent of roofs being flat
with 70 percent coverage and 85 percent are sloped with 35 percent coverage. We
estimate total capacity assuming 12 percent efficiency with 1000 W/m2 irradiance
(capacity = 120 W/m2). Hourly output was estimated using PV Watts and the
NSRD. figure 3.5 shows an image of rooftops on Oahu, including a closeup of the
UH Ma¯noa campus.
3.3.4 Wind Potential
On shore wind potential was estimated using a screening of available land similar
to solar. Only land zoned for agriculture or country and not within 300 meters of
other zones was considered. Slopes were restricted to 20 percent grade or less, and
not within 30 meters of steep slopes, to eliminate narrow ridge tops and valleys. A
map of areas potentially developable for wind is show in figure 3.6. We considered
wind turbine density of 8.8 megawatts (MW) per square kilometer (km2), which
is conservatively less dense than the current Kahuku wind farm already installed
on the island (12.9 MW/km2), but on the high end of 5-8 MW/km2 that is
estimated by Denholm et al. (2009). Potential turbines were clustered by region
into separate scalable projects. Hourly behavior of each potential project—its
coincident potential capacity—is calculated based on historical meteorological
modeling conducted for the Oahu Wind Integration and Transmission Study
Corbus et al. (2010). For all practical purposes, there is an unlimited supply of
off-shore wind potential with a high capacity factor of an estimated 43 percent,
which enters the model as a single scalable resource.
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Figure 3.5: Estimating Potential Rooftop Solar
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The bottom image shows rooftop space islandwide (in lighted in yellow). The image on top
shows a closeup of part of the Ma¯noa campus to demonstrate accuracy of rooftop identification.
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Figure 3.6: Potential wind farm locations
[8] 
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The map shows land that is assumed to be available for on-shore wind development.
3.3.5 Time points and build scenarios
The model solves for a 30-year planning horizon and 12 representative days in
each investment period, each representing a typical day from each month (the
15th), while constraining the model to achieve the state’s 100 percent renewable
energy goal by 2045 in the 100% scenarios. We also solve models that constrain
generation to be purely traditional fossil fuels, plus a model that is unconstrained,
and simply maximizes welfare (and minimizes costs) ignoring pollution external-
ities. The analysis we perform here is a single stage analysis in the sense that
each scenario assumes all new assets are built at one point in time (i.e., 2045).
Switch is designed to consider a series of investment windows so as to optimize
a long-run plan or transition. However, because our focus in this paper is on the
value of variable pricing, we chose to simplify this part of the problem so as to
provide more clarity about the long-run tradeoffs of this critical policy choice.
It is also possible to add more sample days to gain a fuller representation of the
joint distributions of time, weather, supply and demand; this does not appear
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to change our results in a substantial way, but may be useful for fine-tuning an
actual resource plan.
3.3.6 Equilibrium: Merging Switch with Demand
Iterations between Switch and the demand system were completed as follows.
First, we solve Switch for a baseline load profile, which is connected to either
actual 2007 loads or projected loads for 2045 (differences are discussed below).
Tentative prices are derived as marginal costs (shadow values of the constraints
specified in equation 3.11), and these are offered to the demand system. The
demand system returns optimal quantities given these prices, and also reports
Marshallian consumer surplus minus a fixed offset – i.e., the line integral of
demand taken from baseline prices to offered prices. 7 Switch then minimizes
the cost of serving the new quantities, sending new prices based on marginal costs.
During successive iterations, Switch constructs a linearized demand system from
the convex hull of the demand and total willingness to pay (consumer surplus plus
total expenditure). In other words, it approximates total willingness to pay as
a convex combination of willingness to pay from prior iterations (i.e., any linear
combination of prior bids with total weight of 100%). During each iteration,
Switch chooses a new system design to maximize welfare (willingness to pay
minus cost) and offers new prices. This cycle repeats until there is no further
improvement in total surplus from having new prices offered and receiving new
bids.
This method is a Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition of the joint supply-demand
problem Dantzig and Wolfe (1960). With this method, solutions from the supply
problem, in which consumers are given quantities based on the linearized demand
7To find the correct competitive equilibrium in this iterative manner requires that we use Marshal-
lian surplus rather than compensating or equivalent variation. Because nested-CES utility is
well behaved and homothetic, this integral is not path dependent Takayama (1982). And be-
cause income effects are small, owing to the fact that electricity expenditure is a small share of
income, this measure of surplus is also very similar to compensating and equivalent variation or
money-metric utility. For this reason, we only report Marshallian consumer surplus.
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function, represent a lower bound on surplus; solutions from the demand prob-
lem, in which consumers can choose any amount they want without changing
prices, provide an upper bound on surplus. We stop iterating when the differ-
ence between these two measures is less than 0.1 percent of baseline electricity
expenditure.
3.4 Cost assumptions and scenarios
3.4.1 Cost Assumptions
The inputs for the Switch model are based on Hawaiian Electric Company’s
Power Supply Improvement Plan (PSIP) and are summarized in table 3.2. The
report lays out projected costs each year from 2016 through 2045, and we con-
sider models with costs at each endpoint to show sensitivity of results to cost
assumptions.
We summarize average capacity factors (normalized production potential) for
the renewable sources in figure 3.7. In the optimization model, capacity factors
for each project vary by hour. While projects with higher average capacity factors
are more likely to be selected from the optimization routine, the timing of output
also matters.
3.4.2 Scenarios
We solve the full model under a large number of scenarios to explore sensitivity
of results to different assumptions (Table 3.3). Specifically, the scenarios span all
combinations of the following sets of assumptions. Solving many scenarios also
allows us to check internal consistency of results, which is useful for developing
some confidence that the models converged correctly.
Most of the different sets of assumptions have been detailed above. We
described the different interhour demand flexibilities in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.4.
Cost assumptions for 2016 and 2045 are summarized in table 3.2. Overall demand
is likely inelastic, so we focus mainly on results with an overall demand elasticity
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Table 3.2: Summary of Cost Assumptions
Capital cost ($/MW) Unit cost ($/MMBtu) Op. &
Maint.
Category Description 2016 2045 2016 2045 ($/MW/Yr.)
lightgray lightgrayNew power generators
Combined Cycle Gas/Oil 1,653,242 1,415,952 17,452
Central Tracking PV 2,856,257 1,680,388 22,970
Distributed PV 3,650,295 1,511,097 -
Diesel Barge 1,323,183 1,323,328 34,214
Diesel MCBH 3,162,083 2,855,884 33,844
Diesel Schofield 2,481,336 2,241,312 33,844
Offshore Wind 6,205,598 3,882,934 96,710
Onshore Wind 2,459,329 1,986,498 27,400
Pumped Hydro 3,033,333 3,033,333
lightgray lightgrayStorage
Battery 484,283
($/MWh)
146,639
($/MWh)
Hydrogren Electrolyzer 1,596,797 697,014
Hydrogen Fuel Cell 990,562 528,787
Hydrogen Liquifier 42,997 42,997
lightgraylightgrayInputs for fossil power plants
Biodiesel 30.37 48.68
Coal 2.74 3.60
Diesel 10.48 32.50
LNG bulk 6.26 22.01
LNG container 10.52 14.38
LSFO 7.95 29.56
Pellet Biomass 14.00 14.00
Note: Cost assumptions are derived from Hawaiian Electric Company’s Power Supply Improvement Plan from
December 2016. See https://www.hawaiianelectric.com/about-us/our-vision.
for electricity of 0.1 (the elasticity of substitution between electricity and all
other goods). However, we do consider models with larger elasticities because
some scholars may find these more plausible, and because new uses for electricity
may arise that can make use of inexpensive electricity that would likely arise for
significant stretches under high-renewable scenarios. New intermittent demands
may be more elastic.
The two load profiles, actual 2007 and projected 2045, differ mainly in their
degree of variability, including seasonality. Current demand tends to be con-
siderably higher during Summer and early Fall, while loads that the Hawaiian
Electric Company projects for 2045 are considerably flatter. Because seasonal
variability may be more costly to manage than intraday variability, comparison
of these scenarios provides some sense of this cost of seasonality. We do not have
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Figure 3.7: Average output and potential capacity of renewable energy sources on Oahu
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The graph shows the resource capacity of different potential sources of renewable energy, each
ordered from highest average output (capacity factor) to lowest. For perspective, peak demand
on Oahu is about 1000 MW. A project with a 0.25 capacity factor would produce an average of
25% of its nameplate capacity throughout the year.
Table 3.3: List of scenarios
Assumptions Total Sce-
narios
Baseline Scenario Other scenarios
Interhour demand flexibility 3 Optimistic Pessimistic, Middling
Cost assumptions 2 HECO PSIP for
2045
HECO PSIP for 2016
Overall electricity demand 4 0.1 0.1, 0.9, 2.0
Electric vehicle share 3 50% 0.5%, 100%
Policy Objective 3 Fossil, 100% Re-
newable, Uncon-
strained
Baseline load profile 2 Projected 2045 Actual 2007
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a strong sense of why Hawaiian Electric Company believes the load profile will
become flatter in the future, but we have augmented historical loads to match
their projections for peak and average load in 2045. Because HECO reports a
projected peak load of 1065 MW and average of 861.4, but the historical peak
and average were 1249 and 955 (in 2007), the profile is flatter for 2045 than it is
for 2007.8
Much of our discussion focuses on welfare differences between flat and vari-
able, marginal-cost pricing, and those scenarios are crossed with all other set-
s of assumptions. Considering all combinations of the above scenarios yields
3 × 2 × 4 × 3 × 3 × 2 × 2 = 864 scenarios. Computing time required to solve a
single scenario can range from less than an hour for flat-price scenarios, to nearly
two days for some of the dynamic scenarios where many different resources are
on the margin. We used the University of Hawai’i’s high performance computing
facility with hundreds of state-of-the-art cores to solve many models simultane-
ously. Although space constrains us from reporting all individual scenarios, we
have characterized many of them here, and have developed a website with drop
down menus that will allow readers to explore details of any particular scenario
(http://www2.hawaii.edu/~mjrobert/power_production/).
In addition to the above scenarios, we also solved models along a path wherein
we constrain the percent renewable to a range of values between the least cost
(unconstrained) portfolio and 100% renewable, holding all else the same. This
allows us to trace out the social cost (loss in producer plus consumer surplus)
of additional renewable energy under each set of assumptions. Note that we do
not consider the external cost of pollution emissions. The idea is that whatever
benefits society may glean from renewable energy above the minimum cost, such
as reduced pollution externalities, ought to be weighed against these cost curves.
Welfare calculations consider changes in Marshallian consumer surplus (CS),
producer surplus (PS), and charging costs for electrical vehicles (EV), which
are treated separately but included in total CS. We also calculated CS for each
8We derived projected future baseline demand by multiplying the historical loads by 0.693 and
adding 200 MW.
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type of pseudo-customer, each having different interhour flexibility and base load
profiles. CS changes are similar to compensating or equivalent variation, given
the relatively small share of expenditure, so we do not report CV or EV. Producer
surplus is the change in revenue minus total cost. Note that these calculations
do not include fixed customer charges or rebates, which could be used to change
the overall balance of welfare between customers and producers. For this reason,
it may be more meaningful to focus on changes in total surplus and differences
across pseudo-customers. Also note that we do not explicitly account for fuel
savings that may derive from greater EV use. Comparison of low versus high EV
scenarios are meant to show how EVs could change the value of variable versus
fixed pricing, since EVs embody a potentially large block of flexible demand.
3.5 Results
To ease comparison of scenarios, results are reported as the difference between a
particular scenario and a baseline scenario. In most cases, the baseline scenario,
indicated by the boldfaced sets of assumptions in the list above, assumes fossil-
based generation, future 2045 costs and projected load profile, flat pricing and
an overall demand elasticity for electricity of 0.1 (the elasticity of substitution
between electricity and all other goods). Note that under flat pricing scenarios,
interhour demand flexibility has no bearing on the outcome. We choose this
scenario as the baseline because we presume that it is the future that utilities
envision in the absence of renewable energy. To make welfare calculations easy
to interpret, we report these as percent differences from the baseline level of total
expenditure on electricity.
3.5.1 Main Results
Table 3.4 reports the main results for scenarios with projected 2045 loads and
costs. Comparing different rows from this table, one can infer the value of variable
pricing under both fossil and high-penetration renewable systems. One can also
infer the value of having more or less optimism about the degree of interhour
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flexibility of demand. Finally, we can see how much the projected cost trends
favor renewables, by comparing current (2016) costs and projected costs in 2045.
We present a larger set of results graphically in figures B.6 and 3.10. The
first figure shows the value of real time marginal cost pricing in comparison to
flat pricing, all else the same. The second figure shows the social cost of a 100
percent renewable system (negative change in producer plus consumer surplus)
against fossil and unconstrained baseline scenarios, all else the same.
To illustrate what a few scenarios look like in real time, figure 3.8 shows both
consumption and production mixes by hour and season for middling demand
flexibility, the scenarios that sit between the paired optimistic and pessimistic
demand flexibility in table 3.4. For higher resolution depictions of all 864 s-
cenarios, see the interactive website at: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~mjrobert/
power_production/, which allows users to select desired scenarios from a series
of drop down menus.
Finally, in figure 3.11 we show how the social cost of renewable energy rises
as the share of renewable energy is gradually increased from the optimal port-
folio (greatest social welfare, excluding pollution externalities) to 100 percent
renewable. The graphs summarize a large number of scenarios and generally
illustrate the value of variable versus flat pricing, the role of electric vehicles,
interhour demand flexibility and overall demand elasticity, and current versus
future technology assumptions.
The main observations that we can take from these results are:
• A small amount of demand-side flexibility is valuable. We can see this by
observing that the pessimistic scenarios, with less than one sixth the amount
of flexible demand as the optimistic cases, still benefit at least half as much
from variable marginal-cost pricing as the optimistic scenarios.
• Under current costs, the unconstrained system is mostly fossil fuels (4 - 5.6
percent renewable), however under future projected costs, the unconstrained
system is mostly renewable (73 - 80 percent). Increasing renewable energy
shares 5-15 percentage points above these baselines tends to be inexpensive.
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• Dynamic pricing in the unconstrained scenarios lowers costs while increas-
ing the share of renewables. This value increases over time as the cost of
renewables relative to fossil fuels declines, and renewable energy makes up
a larger share of electricity in unconstrained scenarios.
• A 100 percent renewable system is projected to be less costly than a fossil
system by 2045, but only under dynamic pricing.
• The value of dynamic pricing accrues mostly to consumers and may actually
reduce producer surplus, while total surplus always increases with dynamic
pricing. Adjustments in fixed charges could change this imbalance.
• Dynamic marginal cost pricing is considerably more valuable the greater the
penetration of renewable energy, rising from about 2.6% under the baseline
scenario with pessimistic demand flexibility, to 23.4 percent in a 100 percent
renewable system with optimistic demand flexibility. Note that if the overall
demand elasticity were larger, the value of dynamic pricing would also be
greater, as high as 47 percent when θ = 2 and the portfolio is constrained
to be 100 percent renewable (results reported in the appendix).
• The production and consumption profiles indicate that in high-renewable
scenarios, the value of the variable pricing mainly derives from considerably
less use of batteries. In scenarios with more elastic overall demand, much
greater value is realized by growing demand during low cost times when
renewable energy is abundant.
• While variable pricing benefits more flexible demand types more than in-
flexible demand types, even inflexible demand types tend to benefit from
variable pricing, and in some cases, nearly as much as flexible demand type-
s.9
• Optimal dynamic prices vary a lot between days as well as within days,
with many days having zero or near-zero prices nearly all day, and other
9This analysis accounts for the estimated baseline load profiles of more-flexible and less-flexible
demand, but it does not account for individual heterogeneity of load profiles across customer-
s. Residential customers, for example, may have little midday demand and high morning and
evening demand, which would be more costly to serve.
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days having very high prices all day, even midday during peak sun. Put
another way, storage and interhour substitution can arbitrage away much of
the price differences between hours, but low-sun/low-wind days may have
high prices all day.
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Table 3.4: Main Results: Change in surpluses relative to baseline future fossil system with flat prices as a percent
of baseline expenditure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 4.12 87 944 0 33.6 -41.8 8.1 41.7 30.9 30.9 30.9
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.99 62 980 2 58.9 -58.2 -12.6 46.3 51.8 51.8 51.8
4.6
Flat 4.12 87 945 0 36.1 -37.2 5.1 41.2 31.5 31.5 31.5
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.01 61 972 0 54.1 -57.4 -8.8 45.3 53.1 48.2 47.8
4.1
Flat 4.27 124 906 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 4.31 131 900 3 -4.9 -2.7 8.4 3.4 -5.8 -5.8 -5.8
3.4
Flat 4.28 126 904 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.25 107 912 0 8 -20.8 -5.5 2.6 14.8 6.3 5.4
2.6
Flat 100 173 871 0 -38.9 36 -1.6 -40.5 -38.3 -38.3 -38.3
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 128 959 86 -12.6 -15.5 -4.5 -17.1 3.1 -15.9 -25.7
23.4
Flat 100 171 871 0 -37.1 33.8 -2.9 -40 -35 -35 -35
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 137 931 96 -24.8 -14.9 -1.3 -26.1 6.4 -17.8 -28.9
13.9
Flat 100 98 931 0 25 -30 -28.6 -3.6 21.2 21.2 21.2
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 84 1047 75 39.3 -52.9 -29.2 10.1 43.4 30.9 26.2
13.7
Flat 100 98 931 0 25.3 -29.1 -28.9 -3.6 22.4 22.4 22.41 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 92 1016 80 33.9 -51.5 -29 4.9 45.2 31.7 27
8.5
Flat 5.39 88 943 0 34.8 -23.7 6.9 41.7 29.7 29.7 29.7
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.99 62 980 2 58.9 -58.2 -12.6 46.3 51.8 51.8 51.8
4.6
Flat 5.63 82 949 0 38.3 -37.7 2.9 41.2 35.9 35.9 35.9
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.02 61 972 0 53.4 -57.4 -8 45.3 53.1 47.8 47.3
4.1
Flat 73 87 944 0 35.4 -35.7 -6 29.4 30.6 30.6 30.6
Optimistic
Dynamic 80 71 994 32 45.5 -55.3 -6.7 38.7 45.7 37.5 34.4
9.3
Flat 73 87 944 0 35.4 -34.7 -6.3 29.1 31.6 31.6 31.6U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 79 79 976 39 39.3 -54.4 -4.8 34.6 47.1 36.3 32.4
5.5
Notes: In all of the scenarios presented in this table, the overall demand elasticity for electricity (θ) equals 0.1, the baseline load profile is that projected for 2045, and electric vehicles are assumed
to comprise 50% of the fleet. Each scenario (row in the table) is defined by assumptions delineated in the first four columns. The first column (Policy Objective) indicates exogenous constraints
determined by policy: The Fossil scenario restricts any new installation of renewable energy, but is otherwise least cost; the 100% Renewable scenario reflects the intended outcome of the State’s
Renewable Portfolio Standard, and the Unconstrained scenario maximizes welfare without any constraints on the mix of power plants. The second column indicates whether current costs (2016)
or the present value of future costs projected for 2045 from HECO’s Power Supply and Improvement Plan are assumed. The third column indicates the degree of demand flexibility, as detailed in
table 3.1. The fourth column indicates whether retail prices are flat or dynamic (time-varying and equal to marginal cost). The remaining columns summarize the outcomes of the conditionally
optimized system: average price, average quantity, standard deviation of price, and changes in surpluses from the baseline case (fossil system, future costs, and flat pricing). All changes welfare
are reported as the percent difference relative to the baseline level of expenditure on electricity. %∆EV is simply the percent change in charging costs for electric vehicles from the base case. Note
that ∆CS includes EV changes. We also examine changes in welfare for different demand flexibilities, which only matters for dynamic pricing scenarios. The last column reports the social value
of dynamic pricing holding all else the same.
76
Figure 3.8: Hourly production and consumption profiles for several scenarios with middling interhour demand
flexiblity.
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The scenarios presented above assume the middling scenario for interhour substitutability of demand, an inelastic overall demand elasticity for electricity
equal to 0.1, a baseline demand profile projected for 2045, a vehicle fleet with 50% electric vehicles, and costs of production as projected for 2045 in HECO’s
Power Supply and Improvement Plan. The first two rows show fossil-fuel systems with flat and dynamic, real-time pricing; the next two rows show 100%
renewable systems with flat and dynamic pricing; and the last two rows show the welfare-maximizing systems (resource unconstrained) with flat and dynamic
pricing. Higher resolution graphs for all scenarios can be viewed at the website: www2.hawaii.edu/~mjrobert/power_production/.
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Figure 3.9: Surplus gain from dynamic pricing under different policy, cost and demand flexibility scenarios.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with real-time marginal-cost pricing and total
surplus when prices are flat, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as a percentage
of baseline (flat price) expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.1; results for larger overall elasticities are shown in the appendix. The top row shows the value
of variable pricing under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected
future costs (2045). The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained
(maximum surplus, regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle
fleet and 2045 load profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results
differ with 0.5 percent and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of
variable pricing.
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Figure 3.10: Cost of 100 percent renewable energy system under different policy, cost and demand flexibility
scenarios.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with a 100 percent renewable system versus the
baseline scenario given on the horizontal axis, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as
a percentage of baseline expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.1; results for larger overall elasticities are shown in the appendix. The top row shows the value
of variable pricing under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected
future costs (2045). The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained
(maximum surplus, regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle
fleet and 2045 load profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results
differ with 0.5 percent and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of
variable pricing.
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Figure 3.11: The social cost of renewable electricity relative to a fossil future with flat pricing.
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Each line shows the social cost—the loss in total economic surplus (PS + CS)—as the share renewable
electricity rises above the least-cost share, holding all else the same. Social cost is measured as percent of
expenditure in the baseline scenario, which is a predominantly fossil system with flat pricing in the year
2045. Thus, values less than zero imply a welfare improvement compared to using a conventional fossil
system in the future (excluding externalities). Graphs on the left assume current (2016) costs, while graphs
on the right assume future (2045) costs. Comparison of the top two rows shows the influence of electric
vehicles (EV), contrasting the current fleet share of 0.5 percent EV with 100 percent EV. In the top two
rows the overall demand elasticity is fixed at the baseline of θ = 0.1. Comparison of the bottom two rows
shows the influence of a more elastic demand (θ = 2 versus θ = 0.1), while holding the EV share fixed at
50 percent. In all graphs, black lines show the social cost with flat prices; dark green line show the social
cost with variable prices and pessimistic interhour substitutability; and the light green lines show social cost
with variable prices and optimistic interhour substitutability.
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3.5.2 Supplementary results
In the appendix we report results from scenarios that are exactly like those re-
ported in table 3.4, except we change individual assumptions that were held
constant across all scenarios in the main results. We also replicate figures B.6
and 3.10 for different overall demand elasticities. These results mainly show that
the value of dynamic pricing increases considerably, and the social cost of renew-
able energy falls, with a greater share of electric vehicle use and a higher overall
demand elasticity.
3.6 Discussion
We developed the first integrated model of power supply, nonlinear demand, s-
torage and reserves that simultaneously optimizes investment and chronological
management of the system, with and without constraints on the share of renew-
able energy. The model is open source and generalizable to other settings with
multiple nodes, transmission considerations, and multiple investment windows.
We use this model to evaluate the benefits of variable pricing in comparison to
flat pricing for fossil-based, unconstrained and high-renewable systems on Oahu,
Hawai’i’s most populous island. We find that variable pricing is considerably
more valuable in high-renewable systems, that a large share of renewables will
soon be optimal, even excluding externalities, and that the optimal renewable
share is higher with variable pricing than it is with flat pricing.
Optimal power systems with a high share of renewables can use batteries
and/or demand response to cost-effectively manage day-night and other short-
term variations in supply. The larger challenge with intermittent renewables
concerns seasonality and episodic or prolonged shortfalls in power generation.
The optimized system manages these variations by striking a balance between
overbuilding generation capacity for normal and resource rich times and, dur-
ing resource poor times, using high-cost biofuels in traditional power plants and
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increasing prices to limit demand.10 Unlike current fossil-based power systems
wherein the main benefit of variable pricing comes from limiting peak demand,
the benefits of variable pricing in high-renewable systems are multifaceted, lower-
ing the cost of day-night balance, helping to limit generation capacity by staving
off demand during resource lean times (not necessarily peak demand), and allow-
ing greater social benefit from higher electricity use during resource rich times.
The last phenomenon—new uses of low-cost power—is a key source of value
from variable pricing in high-renewable systems, especially when overall demand
is more elastic. Although existing empirical studies suggest that demand is in-
elastic, we speculate that some of the inelasticity stems from the fact that retail
pricing tends to be flat. It is hard to know how demand could evolve in an en-
vironment with long spells of essentially free energy. Currently cost-prohibitive
energy uses, like desalination, may be both flexible in their timing and econom-
ic in high-renewable systems with long stretches of cheap power. Alternatively,
new long-term, low-cost storage options may arise if appropriately incentivized.
While flexible uses of low-cost power are speculative, they do seem plausible, and
are what we have in mind in scenarios with higher demand elasticities. The ben-
efit of more elastic demand is two-fold: it includes the extra surplus from more
electricity consumption while making it easier to curb demand during resource
lean times.
Some have suggested that the viability of low-cost, high-penetration renew-
able energy reflects Hawai’i’s unique characteristics: the state is rich in wind and
solar resources, but must otherwise import fossil fuels a great distance, making
fossil fuels expensive relative to renewable alternatives. The unconstrained op-
tions also rule out additional installations of new coal-fired power plants. Still,
the cost assumptions used in this analysis are fairly conservative, especially in
light of rapid technological advancement in the last few years. By some esti-
10Switch also includes a hydrogen storage option, wherein excess generation produced in resource
rich times is used to make hydrogen from water, which is then stored for fuel cell generation in
resource lean times. This technology is not economic in most of our scenarios, but does show up
in limited capacity in a few of them. Similarly, a pumped-water hydropower option that would
make use of an existing reservoir is not economic in any of our scenarios.
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mates, such as Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Lazard,11 current renewable
energy and battery technology costs already rival Hawaiian Electric Company’s
projections for 2045 Lazard (2017).
At the same time, renewable energy in Hawai’i is in some ways more chal-
lenging than other locations, due to its extreme isolation. In continental regions,
which have much more connectivity, transmission provides another, potentially
lower-cost method of managing intermittency challenges, as well as transferring
renewable power from areas rich in renewable resources to areas that are re-
newable energy poor. The modeling framework presented here can be used to
assess the substitution possibilities between transmission and demand response,
and generally optimizing high-dimensional chronological power systems in a re-
alistic way. Solving such a model would be computationally expensive, perhaps
two orders of magnitude more expensive that our model of the island of Oahu,
but potentially feasible with solution algorithms that could subdivide the larger
problem and thereby make use of modern parallel computing.
We believe these results provide credible evidence that high-penetration re-
newable energy is viable at reasonable economic cost in many places soon. The
low cost of renewable energy greatly strengthens the case for real-time dynamic
pricing options at the retail level.
11See https://about.bnef.com/blog/ and https://www.lazard.com/perspective/
levelized-cost-of-energy-2017/
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Chapter 4
The Response of Consumption to
Fuel Switching: Panel Data
Estimates
Dirty fuel used in cooking has long been associated with poor health and low pro-
ductivity. Nonetheless, almost half of the world population is still using it. The
desirability to switch to a cleaner fuel depends critically on the extent to which
the switching changed households consumption. Policies and interventions that
targeted on improving household’s access to clean cooking energy, including the
seventh United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal, have been aggressively
trying to tackle this issue. Poor knowledge concerning energy use, consumption
pattern, and behavioral response from fuel transition have been translated into
uncertainties when formulating this intervention.
Do households improve their standard of living – their consumption – as
they switch to more cost effective and cleaner fuel? Using the Indonesia fuel
conversion program, I aim to evaluate household response to fuel switching. In
2007, the government of Indonesia ambitiously aimed to encourage more than
70% of all households in the country to switch from kerosene to LPG, a relatively
clean, efficient and cost-effective fuel compared to kerosene. The main purpose
of this program is to reduce kerosene subsidies, as the government spent almost
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ten billion USD in 2006 for it. On the consumer side, based on laboratory
experiments, one litre of kerone has an end-use energy equivalence of 0.6 kg LPG,
under various cooking condition. This program has been successful in increasing
the proportion of household who use LPG from 9% to 46%, and decreasing the
proportion of household who use kerosene from 42% to 12% (IPUMS, 2013). The
reduction on the cost of subsidizing kerosene is claimed to save almost USD 2
billion by May 2010 (Budya and Arofat, 2011).
To conduct this analysis, I use the difference-in-differences estimation strat-
egy on four waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey. The identification comes
from the random variation in the timing of implementation of the program. I
focuses on the kerosene consumption, fuel expenditure, utility bills, and other
nondurables expenditure as they are likely influenced by households’ cooking fu-
el directly. While households in the treated districts may differ systematically
from households in the untreated districts, I show that, within households, ex-
penditure is very similar over time prior to the program. The program is also not
correlated with households’ main characteristics, which give some indication that
there are no subsequent changes that might lead to spurious results. Note that
the estimation captures partial equilibrium effect as it only captures the changes
in spending correlated with the program timing. The ultimate impact of the
program on aggregate consumption could be higher or lower than my estimation,
due to multiplier effects and possible changes in prices.
I find that households reduce their kerosene consumption up to 100%. House-
hold utility bills are reduced by 40%, 1.19 USD per month, on average. This re-
sponse is statistically and economically significant, especially for the poor house-
holds. Fuel expenses takes about 30% of household utility bills, on average, with
substantial heterogeneity across income brackets. This estimate is consistent with
several small surveys conducted after the program (Budya and Arofat, 2011; An-
dadari et al., 2014). I do not find any response to other nondurable expenditures
which provides some evidence that, in this setting, consumption does not change
in response to expected variations in fuel expenditure. Although this paper does
not test any particular theoritical model, the results support rational expectation
life-cycle theory which implies no spending response to a predictable change in
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anticipated changes in resources.
This paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the policy context
of energy transition and its potential economic impact. Section II describes the
IFLS data and main baseline characteristics, and Section III sets my empirical
methodology and relevant validity test. Section IV presents the main results
regarding household’s response to the fuel switching, and how it differs across
households’ characteristics. Section V concludes.
4.1 Policy Context
How clean energy transition influence household total energy consumption? Does
household transition to a more cost effective cooking fuel reduce their total ener-
gy expenditure? Do households smooth their consumption during the transition.
These questions are fundamental in designing interventions that support a sus-
tainable energy transition, considering that cooking fuel plays an important role
in household’s well being (Duflo et al., 2008).
The Seventh Sustainable Development Goal emphasizes on affordability, re-
liability and sustainability of modern energy for all by 2030. In 2014, the access
to clean fuels has climbed slowly from 51 per cent in 2000 to 58 per cent in 2014
(Economic and Council, 2016). Today, in the world, there are still more than 3
billion people, mainly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are still cooking without
clean fuels and more efficient technologies. Policy reports have increasingly as-
sociated the use of dirty fuel with mortality and burden of disease (Zhang and
Wu, 2012). Hence, policy makers, donors, and international organization have
put this issue into their priority.
In 2005, more than 80% of household in Indonesia is still using dirty fuel for
cooking, mainly wood fuel and kerosene. Government highly subsidizes kerosene,
known as a cleaner fuel compared to wood fuel, to incentivice households to shift
from wood fuel. Inevitably, it triggers unintended use of the fuel by reselling the
fuel to industries or abroad. Indonesian Government started to subsidize other
cleaner, LPG, and limit the supply of kerosene.
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4.1.1 Large Scale Fuel Switching
Indonesia, the worlds fourth-most-populous country, with 243 million people, has
been subsidizing the retail price of cooking fuels since 1967 (Dillon et al., 2008).
As in 1980s Indonesia’s oil production is high, fuel subsidies were affordable. But
domestic energy consumption of Indonesia has surged by more than 50% over the
past decade. Moreover, the increase in global our prices has increase the subsidy
cost more than 4 billion USD in 2007. In response to this, in 2007, Indonesian
government launched Kerosene to LPG Conversion Program 1.
The main purpose of this conversion program was to reduce the amount
of government subsidy on kerosene.2 The cost to provide LPG is lower than
kerosene3 and its infrastructure is also more available compared to other alterna-
tives, such as natural gas and electricity. The government aimed to convert 73%
of households who use kerosene4 to LPG. Households who use kerosene primarily
and have not use LPG before were eligible in the program. They would received
a free LPG stoves along with one 3-kilo LPG cylinder. Having this specific type
of cylinder makes them also eligible to refill it under subsidized price. The imple-
mentation is gradual over time and homogenous across districts. The Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources selects the treated districts in a given fiscal year
based on each district’s level of kerosene usage, LPG infrastructure readiness, lo-
cation and size of the area. Seven years later, there is a decrease in the percapita
fuel expenditure but only among those that got the program (Figure 4.1). As
can be seen, the distribution for households in the treatment group and in the
control group are very similar prior to the program. After the program, there is
a big shift to the left which reflects the reduction in the fuel expenditure.
1http://prokum.esdm.go.id/perpres/2007/perpres_104_2007.pdf
2Some other purposes and the detail of the program are discussed in (Budya and Arofat, 2011).
3Subsidizing kerosene cost 25% (0.17 USD/liter) higher than subsidizing LPG (see Andadari et al.
(2014)).
442 millions from 57 total households in 2007
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Figure 4.1: Density of percapita fuel expenditure before and after the program
Notes: This figure shows the density curve of percapita fuel expenditure for treatment and control group before
and after the program. The treatment group is households who reside in the district that get the program before
2011 and the control group is households who reside in the district that get or not yet get the program after
2011.
4.1.2 Potential Economic Impact of Fuel Switching
Existing studies on the impact of energy transition has largely focused on health
issues, as burning dirty fuel produces indoor air pollution that has adverse impact
on health and productivity (Duflo et al., 2008; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012).
Those studies largely based on observational studies. Indeed, we have very limited
evidence on the causal impact of fuel switching, especially on economic outcomes
such as energy consumption pattern, adult labor market productivity, child school
attendance, and medical cost. For example, when household members use more
efficient fuel for cooking, they might cook faster and burn less fuel. They would
consume less, thus have lower total energy expenditure. They might also consume
more, considering that now cooking is more convenient. If there is any changes
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in energy expenditure, will households tend to smooth their consumption by
spending the extra money for some other consumption. Some other possibility is
that using cleaner fuel also save time from fuel collection, cleaning up kitchen and
stove, which then enable households’ hours available towards income-generating
purposes. These potential effects are mixed and difficult to disentangled in a
structural framework. Hence, this paper focuses on the empirical evaluation of
the average treatment effect on household consumption due to fuel switching
policy.
Relevant studies measuring reactions to changes in resources are usually
linked to consumption smoothing and the permanent income hypothesis. The
program is implemented gradually and goes through various stages and thus
households certainly aware of its occurrence. Given that there are many ways
in which households are likely to have responded to change in household energy
mix, it will be difficult to predict with much confidence what the combined im-
pact in household consumption is likely to be in the presence of any subsequent
multiplier, and how those impacts are likely to vary across socio-economic and
demographic groups. In the absence of empirical evidence in the past studies,
this paper focuses on households’ consumption smoothing over an anticipated
change in energy mix.
Many studies have put a lot of emphasize on wood fuel. Kerosene is the only
cooking fuel product consumed by the low-income households in urban popula-
tion, and the second after wood in rural population. While the cost of subsiding
it is high, it is claimed as an ineffective social policy as there are many cases of
unintended use of kerosene subsidy (Mills, 2017). On the health side, WHO is
no longer classifying kerosene as clean fuel, and discourage the use of it instead
(WHO et al., 2012) as burning kerosene has been found to be as bad as wood
fuel (Saksena et al., 2003). Hence, this study fills the gap in the literature by
discussing the impact of a decreasing use of kerosene and an increasing use of
LPG.
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4.2 Data and Summary Statistic
4.2.1 IFLS
I employ four waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal
survey carried out by the RAND corporation (Thomas et al., 2012) that were
carried out in 1997, 2000, 2007, and 2014 respectively. IFLS is known as one of
the best longitudinal data with a very low level of attrition due to its successful
follow-up rates despite of the mobility of the respondents and it represents 83% of
the Indonesian population living in 13 of out of 26 provinces. The data contains
a great amount of information at individual, household and community level
on a large array of economic, social and labor supply characteristics. I focus
on consumption and expenditures measurements to measure the well being of
households.
4.2.1.1 Consumption measurements
Firstly, I use quantity of kerosene from the recent purchase and the unit price of
kerosene from the last purchase as the outcome variables, considering that the
program has a direct influence in kerosene availability in the market. The survey
asks ”within one month recall period, the last time you purchased kerosene, what
was the quantity you purchased?”. Note that this variable does not capture the
total quantity of kerosene use by households, but rather the sum of one time
purchase at one time by all household’s members, during last week preceding the
survey.
Then, to look at how households’ response to the program, I use expenditure
on nondurables in a given period as a preferable measure of consumption, follow-
ing Browning and Lusardi (1996). The outcome variables are a series of subcate-
gories of monthly nondurable expenditures: (1) utility bills, which includes fuel,
electricity, water and telephone expenses; (2) food, which includes food/products
bought/consumed by all the members of household, food consumed away from
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home, and cigarettes and tobacco; (3) other strictly nondurables5, excluding item
(1).
Changes in utility bills or food expenditures might alter the marginal utility
of consumption from other nondurable goods. If this is true, then the effect
on nondurable expenditure is For example, households invest in This would be
true if, change I exclude those to allow separate analysis for each component.
It is reasonable to assume that changes in expenditures for food and utilities
is inelastic and separable in utility from other consumption. In addition, these
component account for a significant share of a typical household budget, thus
the variation is economically meaningful. Note that fuel expense in the utility
bills is a different category from fuels for transportation. All expenditures are in
monthly and percapita real terms (adjusted with 2007 Consumer Price Index).
IFLS uses an up to one month recall period, in which households was asked
about their last purchase history for high frequency items such as food and fuel,
and up to a year for low frequency expenditure such as health. The respondent is
asked to recall the food items purchased, self-produced, or received from another
source during the last week. For expenses like utilities, transportation, and do-
mestic services, the reference period is the past month. The reference period for
medical and education expenditures is the past year. The question is formulat-
ed as follows: ”How much money was spent for non-food items during the past
month?” Responses are collected based on the month of interview. This is not
a trivial issue given the importance of seasonal effects in consumption processes.
Hence, for robustness, I include a model that uses month-year fixed effects.
4.2.2 Program Implementation
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource decides the order in which districts
are treated. Pertamina, a State-Owned energy company, implements the pro-
gram based on the given order. It is noted that the program is targeted based
5This category follows Browning and Lusardi (1996), which excludes apparel, medical services, and
education expenses
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on the district’s kerosene consumption which might be correlated with some
other district’s characteristics which then lead to household sorting. While non-
randomization is acknowledged, my empirical analysis will focus on comparing
households in district that are treated to other initially similar households in dis-
tricts that have not yet treated that might otherwise behave in the similar way.
Table 4.1 shows total households in the sample and number of unique districts
in the sample based on the program year. Later in the analysis, I classify the
treatment group is households who reside in the district that get the program
before 2011 and the control group is households who reside in the district that
get or not yet get the program after 2011. For robustness checks, I consider some
alternative for the control group.
Table 4.1: Total sample by program implementation year
Program Implementation Year
2007-2010 2011-2013 >2013
Total Households 16,226 2,908 960
Total Districts 147 39 9
Source: Pertamina
4.2.3 Average Household Characteristics and Baseline D-
ifferences
Table 4.2 shows the key descriptive statistics of the data before the program. I
report the average values and its standard deviation of households’ characteristics
in the control group, weighted with the survey weights, in column 1 and 2.
In column 3 and 4, I report the average values and its standard deviation of
households’ characteristics in the treatment group, weighted with the survey
weights. In column 5 and 6, I report the within-household difference between the
average values of the treatment and the control households at baseline, controlling
for household fixed effects and province-year dummies.
Primary cooking fuel. On average at the baseline years, about 30%-43% of
households are using kerosene as their main cooking fuel, while 45%-68% of house-
92
holds are using wood as their main cooking fuel. There are very few households
use either LPG or electricity. The trend to use these fuels between treatment
and control group are very similar as shown in column 5.
Households characteristics. Households size is three on average, with total
monthly expenditure around 70 USD. About 40% is spent on food and 8% is
spent on the utility bills. Total working hours for all households members are
around 23 hours per week. Average last year income, an estimate for household
members that worked last year and for whom respondent knew earnings of last
year, is 300 USD, or 25 USD per month. Average yearly income during the
survey year is calculated from reported monthly salaries, about 130 USD, which
are consistently about two of the fifth of reported last year income. More than
80% of households own their house and do not move.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
I use difference-in-differences estimation strategy to exploit variation across time
of program implementation on household level panel data, following Eq. 4.1.
Chrt = β1h + β2t + β3Pr2014 + β
′
4Xht + hrt (4.1)
where h indexes households, r indexes district, and t indexes year of survey, C
is household consumption or their log; αh, β1c are household, and time fixed
effects. Following the literature, I add 1 if the dependent variable is zero before
taking log transformation. Xht is a set of covariates that capture household
characteristics (age, family size, interview month and year). Pr2014 is a dummy
of the program implementation, that is the interaction between treated district
and year of 2014. Using a dummy variable for the program implementation
guards against measurement error. I use ordinary least squares and cluster the
standard errors by district to allow for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in within district as the implementation of the program is varied by district.
Key coefficient of interest is β3 which measures the average response of house-
hold consumption to the program implementation. This reduced form effect
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Table 4.2: Baseline Household Characteristics Before the Program
Control group
(N=2,930)
Treatment
group
(N=12,199)
Within-HH
differences
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Primary cooking fuel:
Electricity 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02** (0.01)
LPG 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.32 0.03 (0.03)
Kerosene 0.29 0.46 0.43 0.50 -0.02 (0.05)
Wood 0.68 0.46 0.45 0.50 -0.02 (0.04)
Percapita kerosene (litre) 1.68 7.32 1.34 6.03 -0.12 (0.46)
Kerosene price (USD) 0.2 0.53 0.16 0.3 -0.11 (0.20)
Household characteristics:
Husband age 36.90 22.06 38.82 21.69 -0.34 (1.85)
Wife age 41.00 14.61 41.50 14.94 -0.55 (1.26)
Household size 2.92 1.32 3.01 1.34 -0.03 (0.11)
Number of adults 0.33 0.56 0.29 0.52 -0.10 (0.07)
Number of children 2.41 1.17 2.52 1.22 -0.02 (0.10)
Number of elderly members 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 -0.00 (0.01)
Use electricity 0.84 0.36 0.92 0.27 -0.14* (0.08)
Own house 0.86 0.34 0.87 0.34 0.00 (0.04)
Have fridge 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.02 (0.06)
Boil water to drink 0.83 0.38 0.93 0.26 -0.03 (0.07)
Did not move 0.75 0.43 0.88 0.33 -0.03 (0.18)
Percapita total expenditure (USD) 72.13 315.13 71.42 381.76 17.57 (17.30)
Percapita non-durables (USD) 57.25 284.38 58.47 360.54 18.09 (15.49)
Percapita food exp. (USD) 31.04 25.86 28.99 49.40 3.28 (3.06)
Percapita utility bills (USD) 6.58 124.50 10.87 159.93 11.70 (12.56)
Working hours per capita/week 23.08 18.95 23.41 19.23 -5.06** (2.13)
Percapita last year income (USD) 302.99 431.12 281.37 617.36 -99.95 (68.15)
Percapita this year income (USD) 129.10 296.46 138.46 464.67 -11.01 (24.51)
Head of household:
Female 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.35 -0.03 (0.03)
Uneducated 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.02 (0.02)
High school educated 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39 -0.00 (0.03)
Diploma or higher 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 -0.02 (0.01)
Worked last year 1.21 0.61 1.22 0.63 0.07 (0.08)
Notes: All regressions use the sample prior to the program. Control group is households living in the districts that get
the program after 2011 (less than three years). Treatment group is househoolds living in the district that get the program
during 2007-2010. In column 1 and 2, I report the average values and its standard deviation of control households at
baseline. In column 3 and 4, I report the average values and its standard deviation of the treatment households at
baseline. Each row in column 5 and 6 is the estimated differences from a regression of each household characteristic
on an indicator variable whether the households are in the treatment group, controlling for household fixed effects and
province-year dummies. The standard error is clustered by district. 1 USD = Rp 13,000.
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contains two components: substitution effects and income effects. Substitution
effects arise when the prices of kerosene increase due to removal of the subsidy,
and households will substitute towards other fuel alternatives as they become
relatively cheaper than kerosene. Income effects arise when the lower effective
price for other alternative fuels increases household’s purchasing powers, leading
to a further increase in consumption of those alternative fuels (assuming it is a
normal good) and other normal goods consumption.
The main empirical challenge is that households in the treated districts may
differ systematically from households in the untreated districts, that is the timing
of program implementation might have been associated with unobserved factors
that otherwise influence households consumption trend in the targeted districts.
To address this issue, first, I show that the pre-implementation trends in con-
sumptions between treatment and control groups are very similar. In Table 4.3, I
show regression coefficient of each outcome variable on the district and year dum-
mies. Table A.1 in appendix confirms that the results are very similar, with or
without household fixed effects. In other words, households in the treatment and
control groups are very similar before the program on their percapita kerosene
quantity, nondurable expenditure and their utility bills. They also face similar
price of kerosene.
Secondly, a probit for being in the treatment group against a variety of ob-
servable characteristics did not reveal any strong systematic correlations (Table
4.4). This result is consistent with (Andadari et al., 2014; Imelda, 2018) which
study the same program. They show that the program induced by the program
has been largely independent of household characteristics. Although households
in the treatment group shows that they are more likely to have less household
members, this is actually driven by the increase in household members in the
control group. There is also a weak correlation that households with less uned-
ucated members are likely to be in the treatment group, the coefficient are very
small, 5%. Overall, there is little evidence on any systematic difference between
households in the treatment group and the control group. For the robustness
checks, I include these control variables and the main conclusion stays.
To some extent, the results from Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 help to address
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Table 4.3: Test of parallel time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Strictly
non-
durables
Food Utility
bills
Trans-
portation
Rotating
savings
Household
expenses
Personal
toiletries
Panel A
ProgramX2007 0.261* 0.128 0.123 0.728 0.066 0.211 0.291
Standard error (0.142) (0.109) (0.294) (0.827) (1.036) (0.215) (0.312)
Obs. 15,058 15,097 15,097 15,097 15,097 15,097 15,097
R-squared 0.642 0.599 0.579 0.505 0.612 0.407 0.448
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Servants’
wages
Sweeptakes Monthly
expendi-
ture
Durables Medical Last year
income
Panel A
ProgramX2007 0.265 -0.002 0.287** 1.017*** -0.542 0.418
Standard error (0.197) (0.094) (0.144) (0.385) (0.433) (0.531)
Obs. 15,097 15,097 14,995 15,097 15,097 15,129
R-squared 0.499 0.353 0.666 0.524 0.455 0.548
Sample is prior to the program. All regressions include district fixed effects and month-year dummies. The standard error is
clustered by district.
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Table 4.4: Is the program correlated with the observables?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Husband
age
Wife
age
Household
size
Number
of
adults
Number
of Chil-
dren
Use
electric-
ity
Own
house
Have
fridge
Boil
water to
drink
ProgamX2014 -1.25 -1.32 -0.36*** -0.29*** -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(1.860) (1.039) (0.107) (0.099) (0.070) (0.054) (0.023) (0.049) (0.064)
Obs. 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094
R2 stat 0.573 0.570 0.506 0.470 0.302 0.576 0.568 0.566 0.460
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Did not
move
Percapita
food
exp.
Percapita
income
Female Uneducated High
school
educat-
ed
Diploma
or
higher
Worked
last
year
ProgamX2014 -0.01 -1.88 -23.50 -0.00 -0.05** 0.03 0.02 -0.00
(0.121) (2.578) (93.590) (0.036) (0.024) (0.038) (0.021) (0.085)
Obs. 20,094 20,051 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,086
R2 stat 0.424 0.364 0.451 0.598 0.671 0.671 0.757 0.455
Each column reports the estimated differences from a regression of each household characteristic on an indicator
variable whether the household is in treated region, controlling for household fixed effects and province-year
dummies. Column 1 - 13 report the main household characteristics. Column 14 - 17 report the head of household
characteristics. The standard error is clustered by district.
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some concern about possibly unobserved shocks that might be correlated with
household’s consumption. Thus, in further analysis, I consider that the control
group as a valid counterfactual for the treatment group in the absence of the
program, conditional on household fixed effects, district-year fixed effects, and
the other time-varying household characteristics.
4.4 Estimated Impacts of Fuel Switching
I begin the analysis by estimating the average program effect using full sam-
ple. Using different timing of the program, I refine my identification strategy
subsequently using alternative treatment and control groups by exploiting: (1)
comparing only early treated districts with the untreated districts, (2) comparing
only the late treated districts with the untreated districts, (3) comparing only
treated districts.
4.4.1 Variation across all households
The program effect on quantity and price of kerosene. Table 4.5 show that per-
capita kerosene quantity in the last purchase one month preceding the interview
(column 1-4) and log kerosene price per litre (column 5-8). After the program,
households no longer buy kerosene and kerosene price is increased up to 70% due
to the program. Note that the sample is significantly reduced to 15,193 obser-
vations for the kerosene quantity and to 9.169 for kerosene price, due to missing
values.
The program effect on primary cooking fuel. I present the effect of the pro-
gram on household’s primary cooking fuel choice in Table 4.6. Column 1-4 indi-
cate the independent variable, which is a dummy variable of household’s cooking
fuel. It shows that the program significantly increases the probability of using
LPG and reduces the probability of using kerosene by 50%. The program has no
effect in the use of electricity and wood fuel. The magnitude is slightly higher
compared to the estimates in (Imelda, 2018), considering that it accounts for
household fixed effects.
98
Table 4.5: Effect of the program on kerosene quantity and price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percapita Kerosene Quantity (litre) Log (Kerosene Price)
Mean: 0.93 litre per one time purchase Mean: 0.19 USD/ litre
ProgamX2014 -1.560*** -1.408*** -1.409** -1.831*** 0.338*** 0.263*** 0.277*** 0.337***
(0.499) (0.350) (0.586) (0.683) (0.033) (0.026) (0.045) (0.078)
Observations 15,153 15,153 15,153 15,153 9,136 9,136 9,136 9,136
R-squared 0.038 0.023 0.356 0.354 0.148 0.146 0.579 0.570
District FE Y Y
Prov. X Year FE Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y
Interv. Month FE Y Y
Each column reports the estimated differences of percapita kerosene quantity in the last purchase one month
preceding the interview (column 1-4) and log kerosene price per litre (column 5-8) due to the program, controlling
for household fixed effects and province-year dummies. The standard error is clustered by district.
Table 4.6: Effect of the program on primary cooking fuel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary cooking fuel:
Electricity LPG Kerosene Wood
ProgamX2014 0.00 0.45*** -0.50*** 0.05
(0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Observations 20,094 20,094 20,094 20,094
R-squared 0.26 0.68 0.61 0.70
Treated Mean 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.40
Each column reports the estimated differences from a regression of dummy variables of primary cooking fuel on
the treatment dummy, controlling for household fixed effects and province-year dummies. The sample size is
20,140. The standard error is clustered by district.
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The program effect on nondurable expenditures. Table 4.7 shows the esti-
mated program effect on the propensity to spend on subcategories of monthly
expenditure. The dependent variables are all log transformed percapita monthly
expenditure. Each Dependant variable is indicated on each column. The utility
bills in column 3 includes fuel, electricity, water and telephone. Transportation
column 4 includes bus fare, cab fare, vehicle repair costs, fuel and the like. Ro-
tating savings club in column 5 is known as arisan. Household items in column
6 includes laundry soap, cleaning supplies, anti-mosquitoes and the like. Per-
sonal toiletries in column 7 includes soap, shaving supplies, cosmetics and the
like. Sweepstakes in column 9 includes lotteries, and the like. Total monthly
expenditure in column 10 is the aggregate monthly expenditure which is the sum
of column 1-9. All regressions use households and month-year fixed effects. The
mean dependent variable is percapita monthly expenditure in USD.
The program reduces households’ utility bills by 70%, or about 6 USD per
month. By switching to LPG, households also reduce their cleaning expenses
up to 70% (in column 6 and 7), or about 2 USD per month in total. With
cleaner fuel like LPG, it is possible that the kitchen would be cleaner and the
households members who do the cooking do not need to clean the kitchen or
themselves as often as when they use kerosene. The transportation expenditure
is decrease, likely because in some cases, kerosene can be mixed with gasoline
used in transportation. Since kerosene is limited, this reduction could reflect the
reduction in kerosene usage. I do not see any effect on any other subcategories
of monthly expenditures.
Table 4.8 shows the estimated program effect on the propensity to spend on
categories of yearly expenditure as well as weekly working hours. The dependent
variables for column 11-15 are log transformed percapita yearly expenditure and
for column 16 is percapita working hours per week. All regressions use house-
holds and month-year fixed effects. The mean dependent variable is percapita
expenditure in USD or working hours per week.
Where does the reduction in the expenditures is spent on? I do not see
any increase in other expenditure categories which might indicate that since
the ’savings’ are small compared to the total expenditure, households might
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distribute this small savings equally to other expenditures without noticing it.
To some extend, these results support the consumption smoothing hypothesis.
Table 4.7: The propensity to spend on subcategories of monthly expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Strictly
non-durables
Food Utility bills Transportation Rotating
savings
ProgramX2014 -0.535 0.017 -0.704*** -0.687** 0.403
Standard error (0.505) (0.089) (0.187) (0.344) (0.556)
Obs. 19,935 20,051 20,051 20,051 20,051
R-squared 0.418 0.539 0.490 0.450 0.542
Mean dep. var. 5.06 31.28 8.75 5.9 2.41
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Household
expenses
Personal
toiletries
Servants’
wages
Sweeptakes Total exp.
ProgramX2014 -0.497*** -0.692*** 0.480 0.009 -0.071
Standard error (0.161) (0.202) (0.310) (0.053) (0.099)
Obs. 20,051 20,051 20,051 20,051 19,886
R-squared 0.319 0.367 0.446 0.276 0.628
Mean dep. var. 1.49 1.87 0.91 0.41 74.77
Notes: The dependent variables are all log transformed percapita monthly expenditure. Each Dependant vari-
able is indicated on each column. The utility bills in column 3 includes fuel, electricity, water and telephone.
Transportation column 4 includes bus fare, cab fare, vehicle repair costs, fuel and the like. Rotating savings
club in column 5 is known as arisan. Household items in column 6 includes laundry soap, cleaning supplies,
anti-mosquitoes and the like. Personal toiletries in column 7 includes soap, shaving supplies, cosmetics and the
like. Sweepstakes in column 9 includes lotteries, and the like. Total monthly expenditure in column 10 is the
aggregate monthly expenditure which is the sum of column 1-9. All regressions use households and month-year
fixed effects. The mean dependent variable is percapita monthly expenditure in USD. 1 USD = Rp 13,000.
Effect of the program on each component in utility bills. Table 4.9 reports
the estimate of each component of the utility bills. The dependent variables
used in each column are log percapita monthly expenditure on fuel (column 1-2),
electricity (column 3-4), water (column 5-6) and telephone (column 7-8). Model
1, 3, 5, and 7 capture the regression coefficient within district, while model 2,
4, 6, and 8 capture within household, controlling for the interview month. Note
that the sample uses only IFLS 2007 and 2014, since only the last two surveys
break down the utility bill components.
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Table 4.8: The propensity to spend on categories of yearly expenditures and weekly working
hours
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Yearly expenditure Per week
Education Charity Medical Durables Last year
income
Working
hours
ProgramX2014 -0.535 -0.133 -0.493 0.115 -0.837 3.671
Standard error (0.505) (0.278) (0.600) (0.403) (0.633) (2.429)
Obs. 19,935 20,051 20,051 20,051 20,094 20,094
R-squared 0.418 0.371 0.378 0.454 0.439 0.486
Mean dep. var. 5.06 29.19 16.3 80.21 301.65 23.42
The dependent variables for column 11-15 are log transformed percapita yearly expenditure and for column 16
is percapita working hours per week. All regressions use households and month-year fixed effects. The mean
dependent variable is percapita expenditure in USD or working hours per week. 1 USD = Rp 13,000.
Fuel expense is the main share in the utility bill, and it is the main driver of
the reduction in households’ utility bills. The fuel expense declines by about 40%,
about the same magnitude as the declines in the total utility bills. There are some
reduction in the electricity expense as well, which could indicates that households
might shift from cooking with electricity, to cooking with LPG. Water expense
is increase, but the sample size is significantly smaller due to missing data.
The estimates shows that the program reduces household fuel expenses by
1.19 USD. The magnitude of the effect is within the same range as several surveys
conducted within small sample size, up to 1.64 USD (Andadari et al., 2014; Budya
and Arofat, 2011). The electricity expense is increase about 13%, although not
statistically significant, in contrast with Andadari et al. (2014) findings that
the conversion program led to an increasing consumption of both electricity and
traditional biomass as households are stacking fuels.
4.4.2 Timing of the program
Here, I explore if the results are differ by the duration of the program. I classified
households who are treated in 2007-2010 as early treated group and households
who are treated in 2011-2013 as late treated group. Panel A in Table 4.10 shows
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Table 4.9: Effect of the program on each component in utility bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fuel exp. Electricity exp. Water exp. Telephone exp.
ProgamX2014 -0.455*** -0.439** -0.154* -0.134 0.013 0.248* 0.101 0.054
(0.136) (0.182) (0.087) (0.145) (0.074) (0.146) (0.076) (0.147)
Obs. 8,443 8,443 9,104 9,104 2,835 2,835 6,660 6,660
R2 stat 0.133 0.682 0.238 0.802 0.377 0.895 0.176 0.776
District FE Y Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 2.71 5.77 1.73 16.96
Month FE Y Y Y Y
Each column reports the estimated differences from a regression of log percapita monthly expenditure on fuel
(column 1-2), electricity (column 3-4), water (column 5-6) and telephone (column 7-8) on the treatment dummy.
Model 1, 3, 5, and 7 capture the regression coefficient within district, while model 2, 4, 6, and 8 capture within
household, controlling for the interview month. The standard error is clustered by district. The sample uses
only IFLS 2007 and 2014 which are the only two survey that breakdown the utility bills component.
the pre-implementation period, and Panel B shows the program effect based on
the alternative treatment and control groups.
Table 4.10 shows coefficient estimates β3 from Eq. 4.1 with different sets
of treatment and control group. As the treatment group, column 1-2 and 5-6
use early treated households, and column 3-4 use late treated households. As
the control group, column 1-4 use untreated households, and column 5-6 use
late treated households. Panel A uses sample prior to the program to show pre-
implementation trend between treatment and control groups. Panel B uses full
sample to look at the program effect on the log utility bills.
The program effect on the utility bills for early treated households are very
similar with earlier estimation in Table 4.7 column 3. On the other hand, the
reduction in the utility bills for late treated households are only about half of
the earlier result, 26%. This is as expected considering that the program is
implemented gradually. Table 4.10 in Appendix confirm that the reduction in
kerosene purchased is less precise when I compare late treated group as the control
and untreated groups as the control.
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Table 4.10: Effect of the program with alternative control groups on utility bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early vs Untreated Late vs Untreated Early vs Late Treated
Panel A. Before the program
ProgramX2007 -0.034 0.010 0.008 0.089 -0.044 -0.034
Standard Error (0.091) (0.115) (0.117) (0.176) (0.080) (0.098)
Obs. 8,589 8,589 1,884 1,884 9,594 9,594
R2 stat 0.381 0.800 0.396 0.833 0.374 0.798
Panel B. Full sample
ProgamX2014 -0.388*** -0.409*** -0.328*** -0.264** -0.057 -0.061
Standard Error (0.094) (0.115) (0.106) (0.126) (0.053) (0.063)
Obs. 12,654 12,654 2,794 2,794 14,135 14,135
R2 stat 0.384 0.739 0.395 0.758 0.377 0.736
District FE Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
As the treatment group, column 1-2 and 5-6 use early treated households, and column 3-4 use late treated
households. As the control group, column 1-4 use untreated households, and column 5-6 use late treated
households. Panel A uses sample prior to the program to show pre-implementation trend between treatment
and control groups. Panel B uses full sample to look at the program effect on the log utility bills (β3 coefficient
from Eq. 4.1). The standard error is cluster by district.
4.4.3 Differences in responses across households
Following the literature, for each variable, I split households into three groups
by percapita household yearly expenditure: below 33th percentile, below 66th
percentile and above 66th percentile. Table 4.11 shows the estimated differences
on each subcategories of expenditure by the groups with income below 33th per-
centile (column 1-4) and income above 66th percentile (column 5-8), controlling
for household fixed effects and month-year interview date dummies. The out-
come variables are a log transformation of percapita monthly expenditure stated
in each column.
The effect of the program is larger for ’poor’ households, although there
is a large standard error for the effect of the program on the utility bills. In
total the reduction in the expenditure is larger for ’richer’ households. For the
transportation expenditure, there are no significant effect on both groups.
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Table 4.11: Effect of the program across different households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Below 33th percentile Above 66th percentile
Utility
bills
Household
expens-
es
Personal
toi-
letries
Trans-
portation
Utility
bills
Household
expens-
es
Personal
toi-
letries
Trans-
portation
ProgamX2014 -0.868 -0.612 -0.881** 0.263 -0.635** -0.387 -0.400 -0.168
(0.625) (0.406) (0.341) (0.911) (0.289) (0.587) (0.415) (0.539)
Standard error
Observations 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,628 6,628 6,628 6,628
R-squared 0.571 0.536 0.551 0.584 0.673 0.503 0.542 0.607
Mean dep. var. 1.11 .34 .34 .54 22.76 3.53 4.64 15.41
Notes: Each column reports the estimated differences on each subcategories of expenditure by the groups
with income below 33th percentile (column 1-4) and income above 66th percentile (column 5-8), controlling for
household fixed effects and month-year interview date dummies. The outcome variables are a log transformation
of percapita expenditure stated in each column. The standard error is clustered by district.
4.5 Robustness
4.5.1 Fuel stacking
Fuel stacking is common. In general, households tend to stack fuels rather than
moving away from previously used fuels when adopting a new fuel (Jeuland et al.,
2015). Figure 4.2 is consistent with this argument. Before the program, house-
holds who use kerosene as their main cooking means, on average, bought about
two litre of kerosene. Other households, who use other cooking means, bought
about one litre of kerosene, on overage. This fuel mix is often unrecorded in
the national survey data and using dummies for primary cooking fuel does not
capture the actual fuel consumption very well. But IFLS includes measures on
quantity and prices for kerosene purchase starting from the year 2000. Thus, in
the next section, I discuss the impact on kerosene quantity and kerosene price.
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Figure 4.2: Percapita of kerosene consumption by primary cooking fuel
This figure plots the average percapita of kerosene consumption from the recent purchase by households’ primary
cooking fuel.
4.5.2 Falsification
Some concurrent changes might happen within the same time as this program. A
clear example would be 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The concern is that the
effect of the crisis contaminate the effect of the policy. The program will impact
only kerosene and LPG, in contrast to crisis which impact all commodities. Figure
4.3 shows that on the financial crisis year, prices for most of the commodities is
increased in both treatment and control districts. But in 2014 and only in the
treatment group, kerosene price doubled. While in the control groups, kerosene
price follows the same trend with other commodities. The graphical evidence
provides some support that the program of the program on kerosene is unique
and distinct from the persistent effect of the crisis.
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Figure 4.3: Trend of Kerosene Price in Treatment and Control group
This figure plots the average of CPI adjusted kerosene price per litre and other main household’s food commodi-
ties. 1 USD = Rp 13,000.
4.6 Discussion
This paper investigates on the extent to which the switching improves households
well-being. Burning dirty cooking fuels produces harmful air pollutants and has
long been associated with poor health and low productivity. The desirability to
switch to a cleaner fuel depends critically on the extent to which the switching
improves households well-being. Using a nationwide transition from kerosene
to cleaner burning propane in Indonesia, I investigate households consumption
response to fuel switching. Based on combustion efficiency and end-use energy
equivalence, LPG is cleaner and more efficient than kerosene. Using variation
in the timing of the implementation on four waves of the Indonesia longitudinal
survey, I compare changes in expenditure within households in the treated dis-
tricts with changes in expenditure within households in not-yet treated districts.
I find that households reduce their kerosene consumption up to 100% and their
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fuel expenses are reduced by 40%, or 1.19 USD per month on average. These
effects are higher among poor households. I do not find any response to other
nondurable expenditures which provides some evidence of consumption smooth-
ing. This is as expected considering the size of the effect is only about a 2%
reduction from total monthly expenditure. As fuel demand is inelastic, a small
cost saving might indicate big welfare improvement. Adding to the literature of
the benefit of switching to a cleaner fuel, the overall impact of this on-going fuel
switching intervention can be enormous.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Comparison between included and excluded group
Table A.2 shows the mean difference between control group (untreated districts
by 2011), treatment group included in the analysis (treated districts in 2009-
2011) and treatment group excluded in the analysis (treated in 2007-2008) at
baseline. Excluded regions are more developed regions thus have significantly
better health facilities, infrastructure such: road, electricity, sanitation, access
to clean water, and school, and significantly have more income and labor force
participation. They are also densely populated with 89 districts in the group
that account for almost half of the country’s population. Using treatment groups
in column 2 does improve comparability between treatment and control groups.
Similar to Table 2.2 that compares baseline household characteristics between
treated and control group but Table A.2 compares households within the treat-
ment group (i.e. excluded group compares to the included group). also compares
shows looks more similar to the control group although there are some character-
istics that are different, the magnitude are small. The main analysis will focus
on districts in column 1 and 2 which accounts for 80% of the total districts and
50% of the total population.
109
Characteristics of the compliers
To understand more about the characteristics of the compliers, I plot the density
of fuel choice based on wealth index before and after the program. Figure A
indicates a high program compliance: the compliers are likely household who use
kerosene before the program which is the target of the program. Wealth index is
a variable that summarize household dwelling characteristics and asset ownership
using principal component analysis. It ranges from -2.75 to 3.17 in the sample,
where the more negative indicates the poorer households and the more positive
indicates the richer households. LPG users was dominated by richer and richest
households before the program, but it shifts to middle and richer household after
the program. Kerosene users loose a portion of richer household who seems to
switch to LPG. The figure shows that the characteristics of wood users seems to
be similar across time.
Figure B.1: Kerosene and LPG aggregate consumption
Notes: Primary y-axis corresponds to Indonesia’s consumption, while secondary y-axis corresponds to world’s
consumption. In 2006, Indonesia consumes 10% of world kerosene consumption and 1% of world LPG con-
sumption. In 2012, Indonesia’s kerosene consumption decreases to 2.3% and Indonesia’s LPG consumption
increases to 3.5% of the world’s total consumption. These large variation only happened in Indonesia.
Kerosene consumption excludes jet fuel. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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Table A.1: Differences in district characteristics at baseline
Mean Mean Difference
Control group Treatment group
District characteristics Included Excluded Included Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3)
Health characteristics
Number of doctors 29.1 (2.57) 74.25 (8.83) 225.4 (28.59) 45.15*** (9.20) 196.30*** (28.74)
Number of hospitals 2.36 (0.19) 4.11 (0.46) 7.64 (0.74) 1.75*** (0.50) 5.29*** (0.77)
Number of midwives 133.87 (5.84) 230.62 (13.08) 332.58 (19.49) 96.74*** (14.33) 198.71*** (20.37)
Number of village polyclinic 49.56 (2.99) 84.66 (6.76) 100.41 (8.91) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
Number of community health centre (puskesmas) 60.43 (2.66) 79.44 (3.3) 94.04 (5.25) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01)
Infrastructure characteristics
Villages with asphalt road (in % of total villages) 50.11 (2.04) 64.74 (1.98) 78.86 (2.12) 14.63*** (2.85) 28.75*** (2.95)
Access to electricity (in % of total household) 68.57 (1.71) 85.19 (1.11) 97.27 (0.54) 16.62*** (2.04) 28.70*** (1.79)
Access to safe sanitation (in % of total Household) 51.93 (1.29) 60.82 (1.39) 64.42 (1.41) 8.89*** (1.89) 12.49*** (1.92)
Access to safe water (in % of total household) 40.47 (1.25) 45.17 (1.48) 56.94 (1.76) 4.70** (1.94) 16.47*** (2.16)
Number of schools at primary level 174.89 (7.96) 370.71 (21.33) 680.38 (43.69) 0.20*** (0.02) 0.51*** (0.04)
Economic Indicators
Household per capita expenditure (in ’000 IDR) 228.53 (5.5) 230.5 (5.29) 267.27 (11.74) 1.97 (7.64) 38.74*** (12.98)
Literacy rate age¿15 (in % of total population) 91.02 (0.75) 90.6 (0.63) 91.66 (0.62) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Monthly per capita education expenditure (in ’000 IDR) 6.98 (0.34) 8.97 (0.41) 16.15 (1.2) 1.99*** (0.54) 9.17*** (1.25)
Monthly per capita health expenditure (in ’000 IDR) 3.95 (0.15) 4.67 (0.15) 6.66 (0.3) 0.72*** (0.21) 2.72*** (0.33)
Population
Number of people employed (in ’000 people) 83.58 (4.39) 224.82 (14.38) 534.58 (32.69) 141.24*** (15.05) 451.01*** (33.04)
Number of people in labor force (in ’000 people) 89.59 (4.75) 243.47 (15.55) 599.15 (37.85) 153.88*** (16.27) 509.55*** (38.21)
Number of people below the poverty line (in ’000 people) 40.79 (2.58) 93.84 (7.37) 169.79 (12.54) 53.05*** (7.82) 129.00*** (12.82)
Total population (in ’000 people) 61.62 (3.34) 168.43 (10.57) 382.72 (27.93) 106.81*** (11.10) 321.10*** (28.17)
Fraction of the population (2005) 15% 36% 49%
Number of districts 184 163 89
Notes: The control group represent untreated districts. The treatment group represents treated districts in 2009-2011 (included) and 2007-2008 (excluded). Each entry in the mean
difference column reports coefficient of the difference from treated and untreated group (=1 if the district is treated) from a separate regression when using the respective variable as
the dependent variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by district. 1 USD ≈ 9,379 IDR in 2007. Source: INDO DAPOER
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.2: Baseline characteristics between included and excluded group in the treated
districts
Mean of treated districts Within-district
Included group Excluded group Level differences Trend differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total observations 14,667 8,097
Cooking fuel choice
LPG 0.09 (0.01) 0.21 (0.02) -0.06*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Kerosene 0.40 (0.02) 0.48 (0.03) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Wood 0.50 (0.03) 0.30 (0.04) -0.05*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Birth outcomes
Infant death 0.04 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) -0.00 (0.01)
Perinatal death 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) -0.04*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Low weight (<2500 g) 0.13 (0.01) 0.12 (0.00) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Birth weight (in kilogram) 3.20 (0.01) 3.15 (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Birth characteristics
Antenatal visits 6.31 (0.12) 8.40 (0.30) -0.56*** (0.13) 0.29* (0.18)
Age at birth 27.35 (0.09) 27.67 (0.09) -2.31*** (0.18) 0.41* (0.24)
Mother’s age <19 0.06 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.07*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
First birth 0.33 (0.01) 0.38 (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Child born in the last 5 years 1.37 (0.01) 1.26 (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Household characteristics
Number of household member 5.43 (0.04) 5.48 (0.07) -1.00*** (0.07) 0.12 (0.09)
Has TV 0.61 (0.02) 0.81 (0.02) 0.12*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
Has fridge 0.21 (0.01) 0.35 (0.03) -0.13*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Has clean water for drinking 0.25 (0.02) 0.38 (0.03) -0.23*** (0.03) 0.12*** (0.03)
Visited health facility last 12 months 0.46 (0.01) 0.53 (0.02) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
Do not smoke 0.99 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) -0.01 (0.01)
Do not have own toilet 0.60 (0.02) 0.42 (0.03) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Has electricity 0.83 (0.02) 0.96 (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.04* (0.02)
Parents’ education
Mother: secondary and higher 0.53 (0.02) 0.59 (0.03) -0.03* (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Spouse: secondary and higher 0.57 (0.02) 0.63 (0.03) -0.11*** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Notes: The table compares within district differences between treated groups. Column 1 reports average characteristics for household
in districts included in the main analysis. Column 2 reports average characteristics of household in the districts excluded in the main
analysis. Column 3 reports the within-district mean differences between households in column 1 and 2. Column 4 reports within-district
trend. All regressions include district fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.3: Policy effect on infant mortality, perinatal mortality and acute respiratory infec-
tion
Infant mortality Perinatal Mortality ARIb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.010** -0.012*** -0.007** -0.008** -0.002 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.024) (0.027)
Has TV 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Has fridge -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
Has clean water for drinking -0.005** -0.005* -0.003 -0.002 -0.019 -0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.013)
Visited health facility last 12 months -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.004** 0.007 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
Do not smoke -0.025** -0.025** -0.010 -0.010 -0.070** -0.072**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.035)
Do not have own toilet 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.028** 0.028**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
Has electricity -0.008* -0.007* 0.001 0.001 -0.015 -0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016)
Mother: secondary and higher -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004* -0.004* -0.007 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.012)
Spouse: secondary and higher -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
Mother: no education 0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.028)
Spouse: no education 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.040 -0.044
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.034) (0.035)
Age at birth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s age <19 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010 0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022)
First birth -0.168 -0.160 0.012*** 0.010 -0.120 -0.067
(0.174) (0.171) (0.004) (0.009) (0.402) (0.376)
Constant 0.199 0.150 -0.034*** -0.027** 0.586 0.358
(0.179) (0.173) (0.012) (0.013) (0.434) (0.410)
Observations 38,888 38,888 38,890 38,890 12,192 12,192
R-squared 0.049 0.055 0.035 0.041 0.065 0.080
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of some control variables in the main DID regression (complete version of Table 2.5).
All regressions are using the base regression with the set of control variables mentioned in Section 2.3.1. The column (1)
and (2) use infant mortality as the outcome variables, column (3) and (4) use perinatal mortality and column (5) and (6)
use ARI (i.e. acute respiratory infection is a self reported health symptom indicated by cough and followed by short rapid
breath and broadly known as an indication of pneumonia) as the outcome variable. bARI only recorded within two weeks
preceeding the survey. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure B.2: Heaping in infant mortality
Notes: The density plot the age at death of infant in days. There is heaping near 0 and 30 days. Infant deaths within
these range are included as infant mortality in the analysis.
Figure B.3: Primary cooking fuel based on wealth index pre and post program
Notes: The density plot shows fuel choice based on wealth index before and after the program. Pre program
uses survey wave 2002 and 2007 while post program uses survey wave 2012. Wealth index variable is a
constructed variable in the survey using principal component analysis on composite measure of a household’s
cumulative living standard such as dwelling characteristics and household assets. It ranges from -2.75 to
3.17 in the sample, where the more negative indicates the poorer households and the more positive indicates
the richer households.
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Figure B.4: Robustness with the cut off month
Notes: This figure plots each coefficient of the treatment effect from a separate regression using different
monthly births cut-off indicated in y-axis. For example, for February cut-off, I match births occurred after
February 2009 to districts that had the program implemented in 2009 as the treatment group.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Supplementary Results
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Figure B.1: Surplus gain from dynamic pricing under different policy, cost and demand flexibility scenarios when
the overall demand elasticity equals 0.5.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with real-time marginal-cost pricing and total
surplus when prices are flat, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as a percentage
of baseline (flat price) expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.5 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Figure B.2: Cost of 100 percent renewable energy system under different policy, cost and demand flexibility
scenarios when the overall demand elasticity equals 0.5.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with a 100 percent renewable system versus the
baseline scenario given on the horizontal axis, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as
a percentage of baseline expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.5 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Figure B.3: Surplus gain from dynamic pricing under different policy, cost and demand flexibility scenarios when
the overall demand elasticity equals 0.9.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with real-time marginal-cost pricing and total
surplus when prices are flat, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as a percentage
of baseline (flat price) expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.9 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Figure B.4: Cost of 100 percent renewable energy system under different policy, cost and demand flexibility
scenarios when the overall demand elasticity equals 0.9.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with a 100 percent renewable system versus the
baseline scenario given on the horizontal axis, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as
a percentage of baseline expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 0.9 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Figure B.5: Surplus gain from dynamic pricing under different policy, cost and demand flexibility scenarios when
the overall demand elasticity equals 2.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with real-time marginal-cost pricing and total
surplus when prices are flat, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as a percentage
of baseline (flat price) expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 2 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Figure B.6: Cost of 100 percent renewable energy system under different policy, cost and demand flexibility
scenarios when the overall demand elasticity equals 2.
The graph shows the difference in total economic surplus with a 100 percent renewable system versus the
baseline scenario given on the horizontal axis, holding all else the same. Total surplus change is reported as
a percentage of baseline expenditure on electricity. The graph depicts all scenarios with an overall demand
elasticity of 2 instead of 0.1 as reported in the main paper. The top row shows the value of variable pricing
under current costs; the bottom row shows the value of variable pricing under projected future costs (2045).
The horizontal axis shows the policy scenario: fossil, 100% renewable or unconstrained (maximum surplus,
regardless of source). The bars show the baseline case with 50 percent electric vehicle fleet and 2045 load
profile, the diamonds show the 2007 load profile, and the error bars show how results differ with 0.5 percent
and 100 percent electric vehicles–more electric vehicles always increase the value of variable pricing.
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Table A.1: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes relative to baseline if actual loads from 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 3.78 91 1043 0 32.7 -28.6 8.2 40.9 27.8 27.8 27.8
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.64 63 1085 4 57.7 -56.6 -12.2 45.5 50.9 50.9 50.9
4.6
Flat 3.78 91 1043 0 32.6 -27.1 8 40.7 28.3 28.3 28.3
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.65 61 1084 0 56.4 -56.1 -12 44.4 53 50.4 50.2
3.7
Flat 3.90 125 1005 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.89 121 1007 11 4.4 -10.4 -0.6 3.9 2.3 2.3 2.3
3.9
Flat 3.90 125 1004 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.91 116 1004 10 0.4 -13.2 2.6 3 7.6 -1.3 -2
3
Flat 100 171 967 0 -41.1 40.7 1.3 -39.8 -36.4 -36.4 -36.4
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 128 1063 87 -12.2 -14.4 -3.9 -16.1 3.1 -16.1 -26
23.7
Flat 100 172 967 0 -39.1 39.6 -0.4 -39.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 133 1034 91 -22.2 -14.8 -3.9 -26.1 7.5 -16.1 -26.9
13.4
Flat 100 98 1033 0 25.3 -29.5 -25.7 -0.4 21.4 21.4 21.4
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 84 1159 75 39 -51.3 -25.9 13.1 43.1 30.8 26.4
13.5
Flat 100 98 1033 0 25.3 -28.2 -25.7 -0.4 22 22 221 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 92 1127 82 33.5 -49.9 -25.5 8 44.6 31 26.6
8.4
Flat 3.68 72 1072 0 49.6 -44.9 -8.7 41 43.3 43.3 43.3
Optimistic
Dynamic 6.24 74 1067 7 47.9 -48.8 -1.2 46.7 41.8 41.8 41.8
5.7
Flat 3.68 70 1072 0 49.4 -43.4 -8.7 40.7 45.6 45.6 45.6
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.65 61 1083 0 55.9 -56.1 -11.5 44.4 53 50 49.7
3.7
Flat 74 88 1046 0 34.4 -34.7 -4.4 30 30 30 30
Optimistic
Dynamic 72 1105 38 44.1 -53.7 -5.3 38.8 45.6 38.7 34.5
8.8
Flat 74 88 1046 0 34.4 -33.3 -4.6 29.8 30.6 30.6 30.6U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 81 80 1085 42 38.2 -52.2 -3.1 35.1 45.9 35.2 31.2
5.3
Notes: Like table 3.4, except baseline demand is tied to actual 2007 loads, not projected loads for 2045.
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Table A.2: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes relative to baseline if fewer electric vehicles (0.5 percent).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 4.39 60 982 0 54 -54.2 -17.3 36.7 54.5 54.5 54.5
Optimistic
Dynamic 4.30 50 1002 1 63.2 -61.8 -23.9 39.3 62.9 62.8 62.8
2.6
Flat 4.51 77 955 0 38.8 -44.8 -2.8 36.1 39.8 39.8 39.8
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.35 49 990 1 56.7 -63.7 -18.2 38.5 63.9 56.7 55.8
2.4
Flat 4.76 126 904 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 4.70 120 911 12 7.1 -14.1 -4.7 2.5 5.2 4.7 4.7
2.5
Flat 4.76 126 904 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.74 111 908 5 3.4 -18.4 -2.4 1.1 12 3.4 2.5
1.1
Flat 100 164 876 0 -29.2 31.1 -7.1 -36.3 -29.6 -29.6 -29.6
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 126 961 86 -12.5 -14.2 -6.1 -18.6 5.7 -13.6 -23
17.7
Flat 100 161 877 0 -29.3 23.6 -6.8 -36.1 -27.3 -27.3 -27.3
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 134 936 95 -23.2 -19.9 -4.7 -27.9 10 -15.3 -26.4
8.2
Flat 100 98 931 0 22.9 -25.1 -29.6 -6.7 22.5 22.5 22.5
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 84 1043 74 34.2 -48.1 -29.8 4.4 44.4 31.4 27.2
11.1
Flat 100 98 931 0 22.9 -25.1 -29.6 -6.7 22.6 22.6 22.61 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 91 1008 80 29.2 -49.7 -29.9 -0.7 46 31.7 27.5
6
Flat 4.49 76 960 0 41.8 -29.5 -5.3 36.4 40.7 40.7 40.7
Optimistic
Dynamic 4.34 57 987 5 56.7 -59.3 -15.9 40.8 57.6 57.1 57.1
4.4
Flat 4.39 61 982 0 54.3 -54.4 -17.6 36.6 53.2 53.2 53.2
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 4.34 49 993 1 57.8 -63.7 -19.5 38.3 63.9 58.1 57.4
1.7
Flat 75 93 937 0 26.1 -27.7 -0.4 25.6 26.8 26.8 26.8
Optimistic
Dynamic 71 995 32 40.2 -50.7 -7.8 32.4 46.8 38.6 35.6
6.8
Flat 75 93 936 0 26.4 -27.8 -0.7 25.6 26.4 26.4 26.4U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 76 79 973 38 33.9 -51.7 -5.2 28.6 47.5 36 32.3
3
Notes: Like table 3.4, except the share of electric vehicles is 0.5% (the current share of the fleet) instead of 50%.
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Table A.3: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes relative to baseline if more electric vehicles (100 percent).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 3.77 91 941 0 34.9 -31.8 10.4 45.3 27.4 27.4 27.4
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.71 77 958 5 48.3 -41.3 3.5 51.7 38.9 38.9 38.9
6.4
Flat 3.77 91 941 0 32.4 -22 13 45.5 27.1 27.1 27.1
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 75 956 0 47.6 -45.6 4.2 51.8 41.1 38.1 37.8
6.3
Flat 3.88 125 905 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.88 121 907 10 3.1 -5.3 1.4 4.5 3.2 3.2 3.2
4.5
Flat 3.88 124 905 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.87 121 910 11 5.8 -10.9 -1.3 4.5 2.6 2.4 2.4
4.5
Flat 100 166 872 0 -42.2 33.8 -2.3 -44.5 -32.7 -32.7 -32.7
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 128 957 88 -13 -9.7 -2.5 -15.5 3.4 -16.3 -25.5
29
Flat 100 171 871 0 -41.9 29.6 -2.8 -44.7 -37 -37 -37
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 137 930 96 -24.9 -13.4 0.1 -24.8 4.7 -19 -30.3
19.9
Flat 100 98 931 0 26.4 -24.5 -26.7 -0.4 21.6 21.6 21.6
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 85 1048 75 42.6 -46.7 -26.8 15.8 43 31.1 26.2
16.2
Flat 100 98 931 0 27 -28 -27.4 -0.4 21.3 21.3 21.31 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 93 1021 83 37.9 -50.3 -27.1 10.8 44.3 30.7 25.5
11.2
Flat 3.93 75 960 0 49.5 -36 -4.1 45.4 41 41 41
Optimistic
Dynamic 6.09 73 962 4 52.5 -44.6 -0.7 51.8 42.7 42.7 42.7
6.4
Flat 4.67 89 941 0 33.4 -19.9 12.1 45.5 28.7 28.7 28.7
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 5.88 72 961 4 49.8 -49.6 2 51.8 42.9 41.5 41.4
6.3
Flat 74 89 942 0 35.9 -30.3 -2.8 33.1 29.7 29.7 29.7
Optimistic
Dynamic 81 73 993 36 47.9 -48.4 -3.3 44.6 44.4 36.5 33.2
11.5
Flat 75 88 942 0 36.6 -34.1 -3.3 33.3 29.7 29.7 29.7U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 81 80 977 41 43.8 -53 -2.7 41.1 45.6 35.1 31
7.8
Notes: Like table 3.4, except the share of electric vehicles is 100% instead of 50%.
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Table A.4: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes if overall demand elasticity = 0.5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 3.11 82 1283 0 48.4 -38.2 2.5 50.9 35.1 35.1 35.1
Optimistic
Dynamic 2.68 61 1508 2 77.7 -59.7 -21.6 56 53.4 53.4 53.4
5.1
Flat 3.11 84 1283 0 45.6 -36 5.3 50.9 33.5 33.5 33.5
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 2.46 49 1648 0 90 -66.5 -37.2 52.8 63.5 61.9 61.7
1.9
Flat 3.76 125 1043 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.80 127 1033 4 -0.4 -6.1 4.1 3.7 -2 -2 -2
3.7
Flat 3.76 125 1043 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.64 107 1083 0 9.1 -20 -6.3 2.8 14.3 6.9 6.4
2.8
Flat 100 171 888 0 -43.6 39.9 0.5 -43.1 -36.2 -36.2 -36.2
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 128 1064 62 -11.5 -15.5 -0.1 -11.7 1.8 -19.5 -28.3
31.4
Flat 100 173 886 0 -45.3 39.9 2.1 -43.1 -37.2 -37.2 -37.2
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 138 989 80 -27.9 -13 4.9 -23 3.2 -21.4 -32.3
20.1
Flat 100 102 1159 0 26.8 -27.9 -26.2 0.6 18.8 18.8 18.8
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 82 1370 37 48.6 -53.2 -25.6 23 42.3 29.1 25.2
22.4
Flat 100 102 1159 0 24.5 -26 -23.9 0.6 18.8 18.8 18.81 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 91 1277 41 38.4 -50.8 -22.4 16 43 28.8 24.7
15.4
Flat 3.23 83 1283 0 48.3 -37.7 2.7 50.9 34.1 34.1 34.1
Optimistic
Dynamic 2.67 60 1509 2 78.5 -60 -22.5 56.1 53.6 53.6 53.6
5.2
Flat 3.23 84 1283 0 45.4 -35.2 5.5 50.9 33.5 33.5 33.5
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 2.56 50 1581 1 84 -66.4 -29.5 54.5 63.2 57.7 57.2
3.6
Flat 76 94 1205 0 35.8 -33.7 -0.4 35.4 25 25 25
Optimistic
Dynamic 84 76 1366 21 52.4 -53.4 -2.9 49.6 42.9 33.6 30.6
14.2
Flat 77 95 1204 0 32.5 -31 3 35.4 24.8 24.8 24.8U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 81 88 1272 33 40.1 -52.3 3.7 43.8 44.1 29.9 26.6
8.4
Notes: Like table 3.4, except the the overall demand elasticity (θ) equals 0.5 instead of 0.1
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Table A.5: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes if overall demand elasticity = 0.9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 2.43 86 1673 0 50.9 -22.1 10.6 61.6 32.8 32.8 32.8
Optimistic
Dynamic 2.22 78 1840 3 66.7 -46.6 5.1 71.8 39.6 39.5 39.5
10.2
Flat 2.43 86 1673 0 51 -22.2 10.7 61.7 32.7 32.7 32.7
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 2.28 66 1791 4 63.8 -56.2 6.8 70.6 49.9 37.8 36.1
8.9
Flat 3.34 127 1187 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 3.37 128 1179 3 -0.4 -7 4.4 4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
4
Flat 3.34 127 1188 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.24 112 1230 0 6.1 -18.8 -2.8 3.2 12.1 3.4 2.8
3.2
Flat 100 170 903 0 -44.4 35.1 -1.7 -46.1 -33.2 -33.2 -33.2
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 128 1155 45 -14.2 -16.2 3.7 -10.4 3.1 -18.3 -27
35.7
Flat 100 169 923 0 -40.1 28.3 -6.1 -46.3 -32.6 -32.6 -32.6
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 138 1032 65 -27.9 -15.9 5.1 -22.8 3.7 -19.8 -30.6
23.5
Flat 100 102 1440 0 30.4 -28 -25.4 5 19.6 19.6 19.6
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 82 1818 28 56.5 -52.7 -22.5 33.9 42.6 29.1 25.5
28.9
Flat 100 102 1440 0 30.5 -28.2 -25.5 5 19.4 19.4 19.41 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 91 1641 34 46.7 -52.5 -22 24.7 43.2 29 25.3
19.7
Flat 2.44 87 1673 0 50.4 -22.6 11.2 61.6 32.4 32.4 32.4
Optimistic
Dynamic 7.49 75 1912 3 72.5 -49 -0.4 72.1 42.3 42.3 42.3
10.5
Flat 2.44 87 1673 0 50.4 -22.7 11.2 61.7 32.2 32.2 32.2
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 3.22 64 1803 3 64.3 -57.5 6.4 70.7 51.9 38.1 36.2
9
Flat 81 98 1493 0 35.4 -29.9 5.5 40.9 22.8 22.8 22.8
Optimistic
Dynamic 87 78 1834 20 59.5 -53.1 0.9 60.4 43.1 31.8 29 19.5
Flat 81 99 1491 0 36.3 -30.6 4.7 41 22.5 22.5 22.5U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 85 90 1642 30 47.8 -53.5 4.2 52 43.9 29.4 26.3
11
Notes: Like table 3.4, except the the overall demand elasticity (θ) equals 0.9 instead of 0.1
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Table A.6: Supplementary Results: Surplus changes if overall demand elasticity = 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Policy
Objec-
tive
Cost Demand
Flexibil-
ity
Pricing % Re-
new-
able
Price
($/MWh)
Mean Q
(MWh/hr.)
SD of
Price
($/MWh)
∆ CS
(%.)
∆ EV
Cost
(%)
∆ PS
(%)
∆ TS
(%)
∆ CS
High-
flex
(%)
∆ CS
Midflex
(%)
∆ CS
Inflex
(%)
∆ TS
Dyn
(%)
Flat 1.78 110 2324 0 33.5 -2.4 48.6 82.2 14.9 14.9 14.9
Optimistic
Dynamic 1.64 104 2522 4 45.6 -21 47.5 93 19.4 19.1 19.1
10.8
Flat 1.78 110 2324 0 33.6 -10.2 48.4 82 15.1 15.1 15.1
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 1.65 92 2512 7 47.1 -39.6 44 91.1 30 19.5 18.1
9.1
Flat 2.42 128 1672 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
Optimistic
Dynamic 2.33 126 1742 4 4.1 -3.2 1.4 5.5 2 1.8 1.8
5.5
Flat 2.42 129 1673 0 —————————— B a s e l i n e ——————————
F
o
s
s
i
l
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 2.30 115 1772 5 6.5 -21.6 -1.8 4.7 11.5 2.9 2.1
4.7
Flat 100 168 967 0 -50 38.3 -3.4 -53.3 -30.6 -30.6 -30.6
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 126 1471 30 -17.4 -10.4 7.2 -10.2 4.5 -18.2 -26.6
43.1
Flat 100 171 945 0 -53 36.7 -0.1 -53.1 -32.6 -32.6 -32.6
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 138 1156 50 -34.5 -17.8 9 -25.5 5.5 -19.9 -29.1
27.6
Flat 100 117 2043 0 20.8 -9.6 -2.1 18.7 9 9 9
Optimistic
Dynamic 100 100 2659 25 45.3 -32 20.3 65.6 27.1 13.6 10.5
46.9
Flat 100 117 2043 0 20.9 -17.4 -2.3 18.6 9.3 9.3 9.31 0
0
%
R
e
n
e
w
a
b
l
e
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 100 104 2515 30 43.6 -43.5 7.1 50.7 33 18.7 15.6
32.1
Flat 9.28 107 2382 0 37.7 -4.6 45.7 83.5 17.1 17.1 17.1
Optimistic
Dynamic 23.42 105 2503 6 44.4 -18.9 55.8 100.1 18.5 18.3 18.3
16.6
Flat 9.28 107 2382 0 37.9 -12.5 45.4 83.3 17.2 17.2 17.2
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
Pessimistic
Dynamic 13.47 88 2546 4 46.7 -40 49.1 95.8 32.5 19.8 17.8
12.5
Flat 80 103 2563 0 47.4 -19.4 14.6 62 19.9 19.9 19.9
Optimistic
Dynamic 89 97 2820 21 53 -34 42.2 95.2 29.4 16.9 14.1
33.2
Flat 80 104 2563 0 47.9 -27.3 13.9 61.8 19.7 19.7 19.7U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
F
u
t
u
r
e
Pessimistic
Dynamic 90 101 2638 28 49.8 -46.1 29.7 79.5 35.3 20.8 17.9
17.7
Notes: Like table 3.4, except the the overall demand elasticity (θ) equals 2 instead of 0.1
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure B.1: Histogram of percapita kerosene consumption
This figure shows the distribution of households based on their percapita kerosene consumption on each survey
wave.
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Table A.1: Test of parallel time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percapita
kerosene
quantity
(litre)
Log kerosene
price
Log
nondurables
exp.
Log food exp. Log utilities
bills
ProgramX2007 -0.239 -0.008 0.213 0.146 0.004
(0.491) (0.175) (0.249) (0.142) (0.119)
Constant 1.181 8.451*** 11.754*** 12.583*** 10.767***
(0.965) (0.203) (0.565) (0.210) (0.295)
Obs. 10,224 8,371 10,168 10,189 10,018
R2 stat 0.512 0.903 0.710 0.702 0.802
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y
Sample is prior to the program. All regressions include district fixed effects and year dummies. The standard
error is clustered by district.
Table A.2: Effect of the program on kerosene purchased, with alternative control groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early vs Untreated Late vs Untreated Early vs Late Treated
Panel A. Before the program
ProgramX2007 0.171 -0.374 1.239 0.697 -0.331 -0.164
(0.318) (0.507) (0.946) (1.354) (0.485) (0.629)
Obs. 8,745 8,745 1,948 1,948 9,766 9,766
R2 stat 0.036 0.514 0.029 0.506 0.034 0.511
Panel B. Full sample
ProgamX2014 -1.596*** -1.775*** -1.643** -1.965 -0.235 -0.062
(0.499) (0.659) (0.646) (1.412) (0.295) (0.360)
Obs. 13,003 13,003 2,886 2,886 14,517 14,517
R2 stat 0.041 0.357 0.023 0.343 0.037 0.353
District FE Y Y Y
Household FE Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
As the treatment group, column 1-2 and 5-6 use early treated households, and column 3-4 use late treated
households. As the control group, column 1-4 use untreated households, and column 5-6 use late treated
households. Panel A uses sample prior to the program to show pre-implementation trend between treatment
and control groups. Panel B uses full sample to look at the program effect on the percapita kerosene quantity
purchased (litre) (β3 coefficient from Eq. 4.1). The standard error is cluster by district.
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